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Abstract
In the domain of data mining and machine learning, researchers have made significant
contributions in developing algorithms handling clustering and classification problems.
We develop algorithms under assumptions that are not met by previous works. (i) In
adversarial learning, which is the study of machine learning techniques deployed in
non-benign environments. We design an algorithm to show how a classifier should be
designed to be robust against sparse adversarial attacks. Our main insight is that sparse
feature attacks are best defended by designing classifiers which use `1 regularizers. (ii)
The different properties between `1 (Lasso) and `2 (Tikhonov or Ridge) regularization
has been studied extensively. However, given a data set, principle to follow in terms of
choosing the suitable regularizer is yet to be developed. We use mathematical properties
of the two regularization methods followed by detailed experimentation to understand
their impact based on four characteristics. (iii) The identification of anomalies is an
inherent component of knowledge discovery. In lots of cases, the number of features
of a data set can be traced to a much smaller set of features. We claim that algorithms
applied in a latent space are more robust. This can lead to more accurate results, and
potentially provide a natural medium to explain and describe outliers. (iv) We also
apply data mining techniques on health care industry. In a lot cases, health insurance
companies cover unnecessary costs carried out by healthcare providers. The potential
adversarial behaviors of surgeon physicians are addressed. We describe a specific con-
text of private healthcare in Australia and describe our social network based approach
(applied to health insurance claims) to understand the nature of collaboration among
doctors treating hospital inpatients and explore the impact of collaboration on cost and
quality of care. (v) We further develop models that predict the behaviors of orthopedic
surgeons in regard to surgery type and use of prosthetic device. An important feature of
these models is that they can not only predict the behaviors of surgeons but also provide
explanation for the predictions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the technological advances during recent years, data scientists are able to obtain
data that are significantly larger, complex and in real time with relatively minimal effort.
Thus, the era of big data has arrived. Besides the need to modify traditional data mining
techniques in order to be scalable to the ever larger data sets, there is a requirement to
relax traditional assumptions associated with data mining tasks. For example, in many
situations practical large scale systems which deploy classifiers, e.g., spam filters are
subject to adversarial reaction. Thus there is a need to design algorithms which are ro-
bust against adversarial attack. The classification problem is one of the most intensively
studied problem in machine learning and data mining. A fundamental assumption un-
derlying most classification problems is that the training and the test data are generated
from the same underlying probability distribution. This assumption underpins both the
research and applied “prediction industry.”
However there are at least two scenarios where the assumption does not hold in
practice.
• Concept drift: In some scenarios, data naturally evolves with time. For example,
suppose a credit card scoring model was built during “good” economic times.
Then it is natural to expect that the performance of this model is likely to deteri-
orate during a recession.
• Adversarial attack: In some other situations an adversarial attack has been ob-
served against the classifier. For example, spam filters (which are classifiers)
routinely have to be retrained as an adversarial reaction causes their performance
to deteriorate.
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Furthermore, the role of data mining and machine learning is not just inference but
also discovery and the outlier detection methods can also be an important tool for dis-
covering potentially new and useful patterns in data. In fact it has been often stated that
new scientific paradigms are often triggered by the need to explain outliers [47]. The
availability of large and ever increasing data sets, across a wide spectrum of domains,
provides an opportunity to actively identify outliers with the hope of making new dis-
coveries. The obvious dilemma in outlier detection is whether the discovered outliers
are an artifact of the measurement device or indicative of something more fundamental.
Thus the need is not only to design algorithms to identify complex outliers but also
provide a framework where they can be described and explained.
The adversarial effect can also be found in healthcare domain. To be able to identify
and explain the potential adversary of healthcare providers could save insurance compa-
nies billions of dolors. Social network analysis is commonly used to study relationships
between individuals and communities as they interact with each other. Analysing Face-
book connections is one such classic example. The textbook by Easley and Kleinberg
[27] offers deep insight into the complexity of a connected world. More interesting and
novel applications of network theory are reported in specialised domains [1, 2]. In the
healthcare domain, social network analysis has been used in different settings, for ex-
ample to study collaboration among healthcare professionals in specific healthcare en-
vironments, to understand the impact of team structure on quality of care [80, 48, 10].
In this dissertation we describe our approach of applying social network analysis in
the domain of health insurance claims. In particular, we use data from health insur-
ance claims to design network-based models of collaboration among medical providers
and analyse the impact of social networks and their underlying network structures, to
discover provider communities and analyse the topology of the emerging community
structure (of surgeons, anaesthetists and assistant surgeons) on treatment outcomes for
patients who undergo specific category of surgeries, for example knee surgeries.
The increased demand for high quality and cost-effective delivery of healthcare ser-
vices, brings the entire healthcare sector under close scrutiny. Medical organizations
such as the American College of Physicians [63] have started evaluating the feasibility
of medical interventions for clinicians in terms of long term benefits, potential harms
and monetary considerations. Decisions related to the adoption or discontinuation of
different types of medical interventions are often a collaborative process. Providers
employed by the same hospitals, who share common patients as well as the working
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environment, may influence each other, and social relationships can become a powerful
driver of learning and innovation, as often assumed in social learning theory [7].
1.1 Contributions of this Thesis
In this thesis, we present our recent research on designing robust methods for handling
adversarial situations. Specifically, our main contributions are:
1. We claim in adversarial learning the aim of an adversary is not just to subvert
a classifier but carry out data transformation in a way such that spam continues
to appear like spam to the user as much as possible. We demonstrate that an
adversary achieves this objective by carrying out a sparse feature attack. We
design an algorithm to show how a classifier should be designed to be robust
against sparse adversarial attacks. Our main insight is that sparse feature attacks
are best defended by designing classifiers which use `1 regularizers.
2. We use mathematical properties of the `1 (Lasso) and `2 (Tikhonov or Ridge)
regularization methods followed by detailed experimentation to understand their
impact based on four characteristics: non-stationarity of the data generating pro-
cess; level of noise in the data sensing mechanism; degree of correlation between
dependent and independent variables and the shape of the data set. The practical
outcome of our research is that it can serve as a guide for practitioners of large
scale data mining and machine learning tools in their day-to-day practice.
3. We claim that algorithms for discovery of outliers in a latent space will not only
lead to more accurate results but potentially provide a natural medium to explain
and describe outliers. Specifically, we propose combining Non-Negative Matrix
Factorization (NMF) with subspace analysis to discover and interpret outliers.
We report on preliminary work towards such an approach.
4. We describe a specific context of private healthcare in Australia and describe
our social network analysis (SNA) based approach (applied to health insurance
claims) to understand the nature of collaboration among doctors treating hospital
inpatients and explore the impact of collaboration on cost and quality of care.
In particular, we use network analysis to (a) design collaboration models among
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surgeons, anaesthetists and assistants who work together while treating patients
admitted for specific types of treatments (b) identify and extract specific types
of network topologies that indicate the way doctors collaborate while treating
patients and (c) analyse the impact of these topologies on cost and quality of care
provided to those patients.
5. We develop models that predict the behaviors of orthopedic surgeons in regard
to surgery type and use of prosthetic device. The models utilize data on past
practicing behaviours and take in account the social relationships existing among
surgeons, anaesthetists and assistants. We refer to the models as the Social Re-
lationship Model (SRM) and Positive Social Relationship Model (P-SRM). An
important feature of these models is that they can not only predict the behaviors
of surgeons but they can also provide an explanation for the predictions. Experi-
mental results on both artificial and real hospital data sets show that our proposed
models outperform the baseline model Online Majority Vote (OMV).
1.2 Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we review related
literature, key concepts and evaluation metrics used in this thesis. Chapter 3, 4 and 5
respectively depict how we can build more robust models based on existing classifica-
tion, regularization, and outlier detection algorithms etc. Chapter 6 describe our social
network based approach (applied to health insurance claims) to understand the nature
of collaboration among doctors treating hospital inpatients and explore the impact of
collaboration on cost and quality of care. In chapter 7, we develop models that predict
the behaviors of orthopedic surgeons in regard to surgery type and use of prosthetic
devices. We conclude in Chapter 8 with directions for future work.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we present related literature, key concepts and evaluation metrics. The
evaluation metrics introduced in this chapter are used throughout the thesis.
2.1 Related Literature
We review related work from two perspectives. We first overview the relevant algorith-
mic literature on adversarial learning and robust classification. As one of the important
application domain is health-care analysis, we review important parts of the domain
literature to put our work in an appropriate context.
2.1.1 Algorithm Oriented
Adversarial Classification
Dalvi et al. [24] modelled the interaction between a data miner and an adversary as
a game between two cost sensitive players. The authors made an assumption that both
adversary and data miner have full information of each other. This perfect information
model is not realistic in many online settings . Lowd et al. [53] relaxed the perfect in-
formation assumption and derived an approach known as adversarial classifier reverse
engineering (ACRE) to study the possible attacks the adversary may carry out. While
this framework can help a learner to identify its vulnerability, no solution was proposed
to learn a more robust classifier. Globerson et al. [35] formalized the interaction be-
tween the two players as a minimax game, in which both players know the strategy
space of each other. They made the assumption that the effect of the adversary will be
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deletions of features at application time. This feature deletion assumption, however,
fails to capture the scenarios where the adversary is capable of arbitrarily changing the
features.
Liu et al. [52] formulated the interaction between a data miner and an adversary
as a Zero-sum game, where the adversary is the leader and the data miner is the fol-
lower. However, the Zero-sum game indicates that the model assumes the adversary
is being antagonistic against the data miner. The model also assumes the adversary is
able to manipulate the entire feature space. We believe the two assumptions stated will
lead to an overestimation of the adversarial’s malicious behaviour. For example, in the
case of spam email, a classifier’s loss is not necessarily the spammer’s gain, and the
number of features an adversary can manipulate is limited. The model also assumes
the adversary can only temper the positive data samples, which is reasonable and ap-
plied in our study. Bru¨ckner et al. [15] modelled the adversarial learning scenario as
a Stackelberg game between two players. However, the leader role is played by the
data miner and the authors assume the payoff of the two players while in conflict, are
not entirely antagonistic. Unlike Liu et al. [52], they made the assumption that the
adversary can manipulate both positive and negative instances. This assumption may
also be an exaggeration of adversary’s influence since in real adversarial environment
the behaviour of legitimate users barely changes. They formulate the game as a bi-level
optimization problem, which, in general, is not amenable to an efficient solution. More-
over, Bru¨ckner et al. [15] also made the unstated (but unrealistic) assumption that the
adversary has the ability to change all the features i.e., the adversary engages in a dense
feature attack. Recently, Zhou et al. [90] introduced a model based on support vector
machines that can tackle two kinds of attacks an adversary may carry out. However, the
model is only evaluated on synthetically generated data instead of real world evolved
data under adversarial influence. In a subsequent paper, they enhanced their appraoch
by combining hierarchical mixtures of experts (HME) [91], where more robust classifier
are learned by training the model under adversarial influences. Xu et al. [85] find that
solving lasso is equivalent to solving a robust regression problem. This robust property
of lasso itself highlights the merits of using sparse modelling technique in the presence
of potential adversaries.
Regularization
In terms of regularization, Tikhonov regularization was introduced to address the
situation when the system of equation Ax = b is ill-posed [78]. This can occur, for
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example, when the system can admit infinitely many solutions. To guide the search
for solutions with appropriate properties, the following optimization solution has been
proposed
‖Ax−b‖+‖Γx‖2 (2.1)
When Γ = λ I, optimization problem is biased towards selecting a solution which has
a small `2 norm. The λ controls the trade-off between how much freedom should be
given to the data to dictate the solution versus the apriori constraint to have a solution
with a small norm. From a machine learning and statistical perspective, models with
small `2 norms have lower variance and better generalization properties.
As data sets with large number of features started becoming available, it was ob-
served that `1 instead of `2 regularization can be used to elicit sparse solutions. Thus
models with `1 regularizers can be used both for prediction and feature selection. `1 reg-
ularizers are called Lasso for “least absolute shrinkage and selection operator” [77, 51,
88]. The literature on both Tikhonov and Lasso is immense. Some recent and notable
book level treatments include [56, 16].
Anomaly Detection
In the domain of anomaly detection, the task of extracting genuine and meaningful
outliers has been extensively investigated in Data Mining, Machine Learning, Database
Management and Statistics [19, 11]. Much of the focus, so far, has been on design-
ing algorithms for outlier detection. However the trend moving forward seems to be
on detection and interpretation. While the definition of what constitutes an outlier is
application dependent, there are two methods which gained fairly wide traction. These
are distance-based outlier techniques which are useful for discovering global outliers
and density-based approaches for local outliers [45, 13]. Recently there has been a
growing interest in applying matrix factorization in many different areas, e.g. [39],[46].
To the best of our knowledge, probably the most closest work to ours is by Xiong et
al. [84]. Xiong et al. have proposed a method called Direct Robust Matrix Factoriza-
tion (DRMF) which is based on matrix factorization. DRMF is conceptually based on
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) and error thresholding.
2.1.2 Healthcare Oriented
In the healthcare sector, collaboration among healthcare professionals has been studied
from several perspectives. Cunningham et al. (2012) [23] have conducted an orderly
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review of 26 studies of professionals’ network structures and analysed factors connected
with network effectiveness and sustainability specifically in relation to the quality of
care and patient safety. They discovered that the more cohesive and collaborative of the
networks among health professionals, the higher the quality and safety of care they can
provide.
For instance, in a classic study, Knaus and his team distinguished a compelling re-
lationship between mortality rate of patient in intensive care units and the degree of
collaboration among nurse-physician (Knaus et al., 1986) [43]. Based on their study of
5,030 intensive care unit admissions, the treatment and outcome indicated that hospitals
where nurse-physician collaboration is widespread indicate a lower mortality rate com-
pared to the predicted number of patient deaths. On the other hand, hospitals which ex-
ceed their predicted number of patient deaths, usually corresponds to insufficient com-
munication among healthcare professionals. Based on a two group quasi-experiment
on 1,207 general medicine patients, Cowan et al. (2006)[22] observed average hospital
length of stay, total hospitalization cost and hospital readmission rate are considerably
lower for patients in the experimental group than the control group (5 versus 6 days,
p < .0001) which contributes a ‘backfill profit’ of USD1,591 per patient to hospitals.
Sommers et al. (2000) [72] examined the impact of an interdisciplinary and collabo-
rative practice intervention involving a principal care physician, a nurse and a social
worker for community-dwelling seniors with chronic diseases. The study carried out
is controlled cohort and based on 543 patients in 18 private office practices of pri-
mary care physicians. The intervention group received care from their primary care
physician working with a registered nurse and a social worker, while the control group
received care as usual from primary care physicians. They noticed that the intervention
group produced better results in relation to readmission rates and average office visits
to all physicians. Moreover, the patients in the intervention group also reported an in-
crease in social activities compared with the control group. The studies which focus
on collaboration among different professional disciplines related to effectiveness of pa-
tient outcomes are also relevant to our study. Another study, by Netting and Williams
(1996) [60], based on data collected from 105 interviews (with 40 physician, 32 case
managers, 23 physician office staff, 8 administrators and 2 case assistants), showed
that there is a growing demand to cooperate and communicate across professional lines
rather than make hypothesises between single professional sector and patient outcomes,
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professional satisfaction and hospital performance. There are other studies that anal-
yse networked collaboration across healthcare specialists to explore different aspects of
professional behaviour and quality of patient care. For example, Fattore et al. (2009)
[28] evaluate the effects of GP network organisation on their prescribing behavior and
(Meltzer et al., 2010) [54] develop a selection criteria of group members in order to
enhance the efficacy of team-based approach to patient care. Other studies include
physician-pharmacist collaboration (Hunt et al., 2008) [42], physician-patient collab-
oration (Arbuthnott & Sharpe, 2009) [5], hospital-physician collaboration (Burns &
Muller, 2008) [17], and inter-professional, interdisciplinary collaboration (Gaboury et
al., 2009) [32].
A common framework for studying how professionals influence and learn from each
other is social learning theory [9, 55, 8]. According to social learning theory people
learn and modify their behaviors not only in response to direct reinforcement but more
generally by observing and responding to stimuli derived from the social context they
live in. An important tenet of social learning theory is that the learner, the behavior, and
the environment can influence each other. Therefore people’s behaviors are influenced
by the behaviors of their peers, their environments and by cognitive, biological and other
personal factors. These notions are well formalized in social network analysis[44, 18],
that uses concepts from network theory to analyze social relationships among a set of
actors.
2.2 Key Concepts and Evaluation Metrics
In this section, we briefly review the elementary and commonly used evaluation metrics.
2.2.1 Non Zero-sum Game
We model the interaction between a classifier and an adversary in a game-theoretic
setting. We assume that we are given a training data set (xi,yi)ni=1, where xi is a feature
vector and yi ∈ {−1,1} is a binary class label. In a standard classification problem the
objective is defined as:
w∗ = argmin
w
1
n
n
∑
i=1
`(yi,w,xi)+λw‖w‖p (2.2)
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Table 2.1: Commonly used loss functions for the two players.
`(yi,w,xi)
Square 12‖yi−wT xi‖2
Logistic log(1+ exp(−yiwT xi))
Hinge (1− yi(wT xi))+
Here, ` is a suitable (convex) loss function, w is the weight vector, λw is a regularization
parameter and ‖.‖p is `p-norm to encourage generalization. When p= 1,2, the regular-
ization is referred to as `1 regularizer and `2 regularizer respectively. Some examples
of loss functions include square, logistic and hinge loss are shown in Table 4.1.
Now, we bring in an adversary whose objective is to distort the behaviour of the
classifier to meet a pre-defined objective. For example, in a spam setting, the adversary
would like a spam email to be classified as non-spam by the spam-filtering classifier.
We model the adversary action as it controlling a vector α with which it modifies the
training data x. However, it is important to note that the adversary would only like
to change the spam data (which is y = 1) and not the non-spam data. This setting is
a non-zero sum game:, i.e., the gain for a classifier is not necessarily the loss for the
adversary.
In order to formalize the objective of the adversary we separate the data into positive
and negative parts, where the positive data is indexed as (xi,1)nposi=1 and the negative data
is indexed as (xi,−1)ni=npos+1.
After the adversary transforms positive data (xi,1)nposi=1 to (xi+α,1)
npos
i=1 , the classi-
fier aims to re-build the optimal w denoted by w∗:
w∗ = argmin
w
1
npos
npos
∑
i=1
`(1,w,xi+α∗)+
1
n−npos
n
∑
i=npos+1
`(−1,w,xi)+λw‖w‖p
subject to the constraint that α∗ is given by
α∗ = argmin
α
1
npos
npos
∑
i=1
`(−1,w,xi+α)+λα‖α‖p (2.3)
where `(yi,w,xi) can be any of the three loss functions given in Table 4.1. There are
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several points that are worth noting about the above model:
1. The adversary is assumed to apply the vector α to the original positive samples
by minimizing the same loss function, but with a negative label. Actual data does
not exist in this form but this is precisely what the adversary would do: change
feature vectors of the positive data to make it appear as non-spam to the classifier.
Since our objective is to design a classifier which is robust against adversarial
manipulations, we model the behaviour of the adversary in this particular form.
2. Note that we are normalizing the two terms of the classifier’s objective function
by the number of positive samples (npos) and the number of negative sample (n−
npos). The advantage of this particular normalization is that it will automatically
account for any imbalance in the data. If the number of positive sample npos is
small, then effectively there will be higher loss for misclassification.
3. The problem as stated above is an example of a bi-level optimization [81] because
the constraint is a separate (but coupled) optimization problem in its own right.
2.2.2 Logistic regression
Logistic regression are universally favored for its generalization property. Here we
show how the two different regularized logistic functions are derived.
Logistic Loss Function with Gaussian Prior
The logistic loss function is defined as:
N
∑
i
log(1+ e−yi(w
txi+b))
Where yi ∈ {−1,1} is the actual class which a data point xi belongs to, w is the feature
weights and b is the bias. Normally, people intuitively add another term wT w to prevent
over-fitting. Here we give the mathematical explanations of where `2 norm come from.
Normally we assume the values of the elements in a feature vector could be any real
number when we design a loss function, and that is why there exists over-fitting. In
the process of fitting the model, the feature vector will only be changed to best classify
the training data, so it could be formidably big in terms of the element value. People
intuitively add a ‖w‖2 to constrain the weights from deviate too much from zero. This is
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equivalent to assume each w j follows a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance
τ j [33]:
p(w j | τ j) = N(0,τ j) = 1√
2piτ j
exp(
−w2i
2τ j
), j = 1, ...,d. (2.4)
Here a small value of τ j means w j is close zero, while a bigger τ j means w j will be
further from zero. The maximum likelihood maximization of logistic regression in this
case will be written as:
N
∏
i
1
1+ eyi(wtxi+b)
M
∏
j
1√
2piτ j
exp(
−w2j
2τ j
),
Which M represent the number of w j. For each w j, we assume τ j is equal to τ:
N
∏
i
1
1+ eyi(wtxi+b)
M
∏
j
1√
2piτ
exp(
−w2j
2τ
),
Now we take the negative log likelihood, the above equation becomes:
L(w) =
N
∑
i
log(1+ e−yi(w
txi+b))+
M
∑
i
w2j
2τ
+
M
∑
i
(ln
√
τ+
ln2pi
2
) (2.5)
The last part of the above equation is a constant which can be thrown away and we get
the final equation:
L(w) =
N
∑
i
log(1+ e−yi(w
txi+b))+
1
2τ
‖w‖2
Although, adding this regularizer will make the w j close to zero, but does not favor w j
being exactly zero. In many application problems, it is better to get a feature vector
with a lot zeros in it (i.e. a sparse solution). To achieve this, we have to assume another
type of distribution for w j.
Logistic Loss Function with Laplace Prior
Similarly, the mathematical explanation of `1 norm is that besides we assume each
w j follows a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance τ j , we further assume
each τ j follows a exponential distribution with parameter γ:
p(τ j|γ) =
γ
2
exp(−γ j
2
τ j), γ > 0. (2.6)
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If we combine Equation (2.4) and the above equation we will get Laplace distribution:
p(wi|γ j) = λ j2 exp(−λ j|w j|), (2.7)
Again we assume each λ j equals λ we will get:
N
∏
i
1
1+ eyi(wtxi+b)
M
∏
j
λ
2
exp(−λ |w j|), (2.8)
And the log loss will be:
L(w) =
N
∑
i
log(1+ e−yi(w
txi+b))+
M
∑
i
λ |w j|+
M
∑
i
(ln2+ lnλ ) (2.9)
Again, we thrown away the last part and get the final equation:
L(w) =
N
∑
i
log(1+ e−yi(w
txi+b))+λ‖w‖ (2.10a)
2.2.3 Regularizations
The main insight to distinguish between `1 and `2 regularization can be obtained by con-
sidering the one-dimensional linear regression problem solved using the least squares
method. Extensions to higher dimensions and when features are correlated adds to sym-
bol complexity but will be discussed wherever necessary.
Suppose we are given n data points (yi,xi)ni=1 and are interested in solving the linear
regression problem. We assume a Gaussian error model which reduces to solving the
least square problem. There are at least three scenarios:
Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
Here our aim is to select a wOLS which minimizes
n
∑
i=1
(yi−wxi)2 (2.11)
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We take derivative of the above equation and make it equal to zero:
2(y−wT x)x = 0
w = yT x
It can be show that wols is dot product y ·x.
Tichonov or Ridge
Estimate a wridge which minimizes
n
∑
i=1
(yi−wxi)2+λw2, (2.12)
where λ > 0. Again, it is straightforward to show that wridge = y·x1+λ . This clearly shows
that as λ increases,the magnitude of the estimator wridge scales towards zero.
Lasso
Estimate wlasso which minimizes
f (w) =
n
∑
i=1
(yi−wxi)2+λ |w| (2.13)
Now as |w| is not differentiable we have to examine the sub-gradient(∂ ) and work
through all the cases. The sub-gradient of f (w) is given as
∂ ( f (w)) =

w−y ·x−λ if w< 0
[−y ·x−λ ,−y ·x+λ ] if w = 0
w−y ·x+λ if w> 0
(2.14)
We now have to examine under what conditions will 0 ∈ ∂ (w). This can happen under
the following three scenarios which depend upon the strength and direction of the cor-
relation y.x.
wlasso =

y ·x+λ if y ·x<−λ
0 if y ·x ∈ [−λ ,λ ]
y ·x−λ if y ·x> λ
(2.15)
The above result clearly shows that wlasso will be zero when y and x are weakly
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of a star, a line, a circle and a complete graph.
correlated relative to λ . In the multi-dimensional case, this observation has been gen-
eralized known as SafeRule, which is used for pruning variables whose weight in
the solution vector will be zero. In particular, assume that the data is given in the form
(y,X), where X is matrix representing the independent variables. Then the SafeRule
[34] asserts that wilasso = 0 if
|XTi y|< λ −‖Xi‖2‖y‖2
λmax−λ
λmax
, (2.16)
where λmax = ‖XT y‖∞. This has been used to safely remove Xi from the data set as it
will not have any impact on the model.
2.2.4 Network concepts
Degree Centralisation
To explain degree centralisation, we need to first define degree centrality. Being one
of the basic measures of network centrality, degree centrality captures the percentage of
nodes that are connected to a particular node in a network. It highlights the node with
the most connections to other actors in the network, and can be defined by the following
equation for the actor (or node) i in a network carrying N actors (Wasserman and Faust
2003) [74]:
C
′
D =
d(ni)
N−1
The subscript D for ‘degree’ and d(ni) indicates the amount of actors with whom actor i
is adjacent. The maximum value for C
′
D reaches 1 as actor i is linked with everyone else
in the network. Network degree centralisation is measured based on the set of degree
centralities, which represents the collection of degree indices of N actors in a network.
Formally, degree centralisation can be summarised by the following equation (Freeman
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et al. 1979) [31]:
CD =
∑Ni=1[CD(n∗)−CD(ni)]
[(N−1)][(N−2)]
Where, {CD(ni)} are the degree indices of N actors and CD(n∗) is the largest observed
value in the degree indices. For a network, degree centralisation (i.e. the index CD)
reaches its maximum value of 1 when one actor chooses all other (N−1) actors and the
other actors interact only with this one (i.e. the situation in a star graph as illustrated in
Figure 2.1). On the other hand, CD attains its minimum value of 0 when all degrees are
equal (As portrayed in Figure 2.1, i.e. the setting in a circle graph). Thus, regarding to
both a star and circle graph, CD signifies varying amounts of centralisation of degrees.
Closeness Centralisation
Likewise, closeness centrality needs to be defined before we make clear closeness
centralisation. Being another aspect of actor centrality based on closeness, closeness
centrality focuses on how ‘close’ an actor is to all the other actors in a network (Freeman
et al. 1979) [31]. The idea is that if an actor can instantly interact with all other actors in
a network, then it is of central stand. In the context of a communication relation, actors
with central place need not rely on other actors for the relaying of information. For an
individual actor, it can be represented as a function of shortest distances between that
actor and all other remaining actors in the network. The following equation represents
the closeness centrality for a node i in a network having N actors (Freeman et al. 1979;
Wasserman and Faust 2003) [31, 74]:
C
′
C(ni) =
N−1
∑Nj=1 d(ni,n j)
Where, the subscript C for ‘closeness’, d(ni,n j) is the number of lines in the shortest
path between actor i and actor j, and the sum is taken over all i 6= j. A higher value of
C
′
C(ni) indicates that actor i is closer to other actors of the network, and will be 1 when
actor i has direct links with all other actors of the network. The set of closeness central-
ities, which represents the collection of closeness indices of N actors in a network, can
be summarised by the following equation to measure network closeness centralisation
(Freeman et al. 1979) [31]:
CC =
∑Ni=1[C
′
C(n
∗)−C′C(ni)]
[N−1][N−2]/[2N−3]
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Where, {C′C(ni)} are the closeness indices of N actors and C
′
C(ni) is the largest recog-
nized value in closeness indices. For a network, closeness centralisation (i.e. the index
CC) reaches its maximum value of unity when one actor chooses all other (N−1) actors
and the other actors have shortest distances (i.e. geodesics) of length 2 to the remaining
(N−2) actors (i.e. the situation in a star graph as illustrated in Figure 2.1). This index
(i.e. CC) can attain its minimum value of 0 when the lengths of shortest distances (i.e.
geodesics) are all equal (i.e. the situation in a complete graph and circle graph as il-
lustrated in Figure 2.1). Thus, indicates varying amounts of centralisation of closeness
compared to star, circle and complete graph.
Betweenness Centralisation
Betweenness centrality will be defined first before explaining betweenness central-
isation. Betweenness centrality is obtained by deciding the frequency of a particular
node being on the shortest path between any pair of actors (or nodes) in the network.
It views an actor as being in a favoured position to the extent that the actor falls on the
shortest paths between other pairs of actors in the network. That is, nodes that occur on
many shortest paths between other pairs of nodes have higher betweenness centrality
than those that do not (Freeman 1978) [30]. Therefore, it can be regarded as a measure
of strategic advantage and information control. In a network of size n, the betweenness
centrality for an actor (or node) i can be defined by the following equation (Wasserman
and Faust 2003) [74]:
C
′
B(ni) =
∑ j<k
gi j(ni)
g jk
[(N−1)(N−2)]/2
Where, i 6= j 6= k; g jk(ni) represents the number of shortest paths linking the two actors
that contain actor i; and g jk is the number of shortest paths linking actor j and k. From
the set of betweenness centralities of N actors in a network betweenness centralisation
can be defined by the following equation:
CB =
∑Ni=1[CB(n∗)−CB(ni)]
N−1
Where, {C′B(ni)} are the betweenness indices of N actors and CB(n∗) is the largest
observed value in betweenness indices. For a network, betweenness centralisation (i.e.
the index CB) reaches its maximum value of unity when one actor chooses all other
(N − 1) actors and the other actors have shortest distances (i.e. geodesics) of length
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2 to the remaining (N − 2) actors (i.e. the situation in a star graph as illustrated in
Figure 2.1). This index (i.e. CB) can attain its minimum value of 0 when all actors have
exactly the same actor betweenness index (i.e. the situation in a line graph as illustrated
in Figure 2.1). Thus, CB indicates varying amounts of centralisation of betweenness
compared to both star and line graph.
Density
Density measures the connectivity of a graph. For example, if a graph G has N
nodes, V edges then the density DG of the graph G is calculated as :
DG =
2∗V
N(N−1)
DG reaches maximum value as 1 when the graph is fully connected, and reaches mini-
mum value as 0 when there is no edge.
2.2.5 Confusion Matrix
Confusion matrix, also known as contingency matrix, is a popular method for visualiz-
ing performance. Various metrics can be derived from the values in the matrix. We take
binary prediction as an example.
Table 2.2: Representation of Classification Results via a Confusion Matrix
True Label
Negative Positive
Predicted Label
Negative True Negative (TN) False Negative (FN)
Postive False Positive (FP) True Positive (TP)
As shown in Table 2.2, the classification results are grouped into four subsets: true
positives (TP), false positives (FP), false negatives (FN) and true negatives (TN). Eval-
uation metrics are calculated based on the four subset values.
The classification accuracy is calculated as T P+T NT P+FP+FN+T N . Other classification
metrics include: (i) true positive rate (also known as sensitivity, or recall) which is
defined as T PT P+FN ; (ii) false positive rate defined as
FP
FP+T N ; (iii) true negative rate (also
known as specificity) defined as T NT N+FP ; and (iv) precision defined as
T P
T P+FP .
The metric of F1–measure (harmonic mean of precision and recall) is also widely
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used. F1-measure is defined as the harmonic mean of precision and recall:
F1−measure = 2× precision× recall
precision+ recall
(2.17)
2.2.6 ROC
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) is a curve for measuring binary classification
performance. The term “receiver operating characteristic” first came from tests of the
ability of World War II radar operators to determine whether a blip on the radar screen
represented an object (signal) or noise. Provided the predicting result is a probabil-
ity between 0 and 1. Each point in the curve is plotted as true positive rate to false
positive rate as one varying the discrimination threshold. A rational behaving classifi-
cation algorithm would have a corresponding curve above the y = x line, which is the
random guess classifier. The better a classifier performs, the closer the corresponding
curve reaches the top left corner. Visually comparing different ROC outcomes can be
subjective and time consuming, Thus the area under the curve (AUC) is a quantitative
measurement of how good the curve is. It is measured as the percentage of the area
under the ROC curve. A perfect prediction would have a AUC value of 1 and a random
guess with a AUC value around 0.5.
Chapter 3
On Sparse Feature Attacks in
Adversarial Learning
This chapter is based on the following publication:
Wang, Fei, Wei Liu, and Sanjay Chawla. On Sparse Feature Attacks in Adver-
sarial Learning. IEEE International Conference on Data Mining series (ICDM), 2014.
3.1 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is to take the adversary into account during the design of classi-
fier. Most existing work on adversarial learning make the assumption that all features of
the training data will be simultaneously attacked (manipulated) by an adversary (which
we call “dense feature attacks”). Here we propose and investigate a model where an
adversary will only choose to manipulate a subset of the features in order to minimize
its manipulation cost (which we call “sparse feature attacks”). But more importantly
this is because the adversary wants to construct spam so that it looks like non-spam to
the classifier and the reader actually consume the spam.
Fig. 3.1 illustrates the difference between dense and sparse feature attacks. This
result is obtained from our experiment results on the famous hand-written digit data,
where we use digits “7” and “9” as positive and negative class labels respectively. While
dense feature attacks (Fig. 1(b)) transforms many of the original pixels (which are the
features) of the original “7” to make it mis-classified as “9”, sparse feature attacks (Fig.
1(c)) only need to transform one pixel to achieve the same misclassification. Therefore
20
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(a) Original 7 as the positive label (b) Dense feature attack on 7
(c) Sparse feature attack on 7 (d) Original 9 as the negative label
Figure 3.1: Sparse feature attack identifies the most significant feature that distinguishes
“7” and “9”, and keeps most original pixels intact after the attack.
a rational adversary is likely to select sparse feature attacks to significantly reduce the
cost of the data transformation and simultaneously make the spam continue to look like
non-spam to the classifier.
How are dense and sparse attacks modelled?
With the help of an example we demonstrate the game theoretic aspects of the two types
of attacks. We use a two-class classification problem in two dimensional feature space
as an example:
(Step 1) The data miner uses an acquired labelled data set to build a classifier (e.g., a
spam filter). Figure 3.2a depicts the distributions of positive and negative data and the
classification boundary.
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Figure 3.2: Adversarial classification problems in two dimensional space. Each circle
represents a group of data in the same category. Straight lines represent the classification
boundaries.
(Step 2) An adversary (e.g., a spammer) deliberately transforms the positive data (e.g.,
spam email) towards the negative ones (e.g., legitimate emails) so as to cross the de-
cision boundary. In Figure 3.2b, with dense feature attack, a spammer can manipulate
the whole feature spaces, which may be infeasible. Moreover, the attack transforms the
spam email to look more similar to non-spam email, which will decrease the advertis-
ing utility of the spammer. In Figure 3.2c, assuming sparse feature attack, an adversary
can only transform positive data either horizontally or vertically (by manipulating fea-
tures only along dimension 1 or 2). The sparse attack is reasonable since spammer can
only have a limited budget to manipulate the features. More importantly, by moving
the spams toward the side of the non-spam emails region, adversary keeps a reasonable
advertising utility by keeping the spam distinctive from non-spam and consumed by
users as spams.
(Step 3) Data miner responds by rebuilding the classifier. Under dense feature attack
a classifier with an `2 regularizer moves its boundary towards negative data to adapt to
the new situation, and thus suffers a substantial loss in classification accuracy. How-
ever, under sparse feature attacks, the classifier with an `1 regularizer adapts itself by
changing the slope of the boundary, i.e., the boundary becomes flatter as it is a sparse
vector.
In an adversarial environment with high dimensionality, the three-step game given
here is played repeatedly in time. We claim when both players are utilizing sparse
strategies, a more robust classifier be designed. In summary, we make the following
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contributions:
• We derive a new game-theoretic model which formulates the interactions between
the data miner and the adversary as a non zero-sum game.
• We propose regularized loss functions so that the game is cast into two convex
optimization problems, and propose an algorithm to solve the game.
• We investigate the use and robustness of the `1 and `2 regularizers (both for the
data miner and the adversary) to examine the advantages of sparse models.
• We conduct experiments on two real email spam data sets and a hand-written digit
data set which confirm the superiority of the sparse models against adversarial
manipulation.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. We elaborate on the approach to solve the
game in Section 3.2. Finally, in Section 3.3 we conduct the experiments together with
analysis. Section 3.4 contains conclusions and future work.
3.2 Solving The Non Zero-sum Game
Our sparse model differs from the previous game theoretical models as summarized
in Table 3.1. We note that in the column ‘Adversarial Modification’, only Bru¨ckner
et al. [15] has a different formulation, which modifies all the data point in the union
of classification boundary w, where τi is a scalar associated with each data point. In
the column ‘Adversarial attack type’, Liu et al. [52] assume a zero-sum model Zhou
et al. [90] make the assumption that classification boundary w is not disclosed to the
adversary. In the column ‘Adversarial budget’ and ‘attack type’, only our sparse model
incorporates a pre-defined the budget and sparse feature attack.
Table 3.1: Comparisons of our sparse model with previous game theoretic models.
Zero-sum Game Non Zero Sum Game
Paper Liu et al. [52] Bru¨ckner et al. [15] Zhou et al. [90] our sparse model
Adversarial Modification xnposi = x
npos
i +α x
n
i = x
n
i + τi ∗w xnposi = xnposi +α xnposi = xnposi +α
Adversarial attack type Antagonistic,aware of w Conflict, aware of w Conflict, not aware of w Conflict, aware of w
Adversarial Budget Not defined Not defined Not defined Defined
Attack type Dense feature attack Dense feature attack Dense feature attack Sparse feature attack
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The above non zero-sum game in the case of adversarial classification can be solved
as follows:
Data miner chooses strategy w0 based on the observed samples drawn from the
sample space by minimizing its loss function:
w0 = argminw 1n ∑
n
i=1 `(yi,wT xi)+λw‖w‖p.
In the following steps, k = 1, ...+∞;
1. Adversary chooses strategy αk, which is the manipulation vector, with the knowl-
edge of data miner’s strategy wk−1,
i.e., αk = argminα 1npos ∑
npos
i=1 `(−1,wTk−1(xi+α))+λα‖α‖p.
The manipulation is then applied to the sample space x∗nposi = x
npos
i +αk.
2. Data miner chooses strategy wk based on the samples drawn from the manipulated
sample space.
wk = argminw 1n ∑
n
i=1 `(yi,wT x∗i )+λw‖w‖p.
The above two steps are repeated sequentially and the game terminate with the accumu-
lated change applied by the adversary reaches a predefined budget MB>∑k=1,2,...,n ‖αk‖1
(which will be defined in Section 3.2.2). The pseudo-code of this procedure is described
in Algorithm 1.
The goal of the data miner is to determine a decision boundary based on continu-
ously manipulated training data in each step. For the adversary, the goal is to determine
a manipulating vector based on a given budget in each step. What we are interested
is an adapted classifier, i.e., feature weights wk, which has the potential of being more
robust on future adversarially influenced data set. A classifier learnt from the game is
designed to be more robust to future manipulations as shown in Figure 3.3.
3.2.1 Lasso and robust regression
A learning algorithm is robust if the model it is resistant to bounded perturbations in
the data. Robust learning algorithms is an active area of research and the robust linear
regression problem is defined as
min
w∈Rd
{max
|z|≤λ
‖y− (x+ z)w‖2}. (3.1)
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Algorithm 1 Non Zero-sum Game
Input: Training data D = {xi,yi}ni=1, minimum budget MB, λw, λα and Norm p
Output: w and α
1: // Build the initial classifier using original training data:
2: w = argminw 1n ∑
n
i=1 `(yi,w,xi)+λw‖w‖p
3: Cost← 0,αSum← 0
4: while Cost <= MB do
5: // Step 1: Adversary attack (see explanation in Section III)
6: // Learn α by assigning negative label to positive samples.
7: α = argminα 1npos ∑
npos
i=1 `(−1,w,(xi+α))+λα‖α‖p
8: for positive data : x∗nposi = x
npos
i +α
9: // Step 2: Data miner responds
10: w = argminw 1n ∑
n
i=1 `(yi,w,x∗i )+λw‖w‖p
11: // Calculate accumulated cost
12: Cost+= ‖α‖1
13: end while
14: return w generated
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Figure 3.3: The graph demonstrating the merits of using a game-theoretic classifier.
The key insight about robust regression as defined in [85] can be derived from consid-
ering the one-dimensional case [82], i.e. we assume d = 1. For example, we first notice
that
max
|z|≤λ
|y− (x+ z)w| ≤ |y− xw|+ z|w|.
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Now consider a specific z∗ =−λ sgn(w)sgn(y− xw). One can observed that |z∗| ≤ λ .
max
|z|≤λ
|y− (x+ z)w| ≥ |y− (x+ z∗)w|
= |y− xw|+ |λ sgn(w)sgn(y− xw)w|
= |y− xw|+λ |w|,
thus
max
|z|≤λ
|y− (x+ z)w|= |(y− xw)|+λ |w|. (3.2)
This generalizes to
min
w∈Rd
{max
z∈µ ‖y− (x+ z)w‖2}= minw∈Rd ‖y−xw‖2+
d
∑
i=1
λi‖wi‖1, (3.3)
where z ∈ µ is the worst case disturbance of noise and µ has
µ , {(δ1, ...,δd)|‖δi‖2 ≤ λi, i = 1, ...,d},
where δ is the range of disturbance.
This shows solving an `1 regularized least square problem is equivalent to solving
a worst case linear square problem with noise z. In other words, we are assuming
the existence of an adversary with a perturbation matrix of z. More importantly, this
robust regression equivalence provides us a way for setting a reasonable budget for the
adversary.
3.2.2 Robust regression and minimum budget of adversary
Since we know that by adding `1 regularizer, we are practically assuming there is an
adversary that is adding noise to both positive and negative data to maximize the loss
of the classifier according to the classification boundary. The largest perturbation z can
achieve is ‖zi‖2 = ‖δi‖2 = λi, where zi is the i-th column of z. Assume λi = λ ,∀i,
then ‖z‖2 =
√
dλ . Suppose λ ∗(n,d) is tuned with cross validation, where the training and
test portions are ordered in time, not randomly divided. Then the intuition is that real
adversary should have the ability to exert manipulation on data at least as much as the
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corresponding perturbation ‖z∗‖2 =
√
dλ ∗(n,d). Assume∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
α
...
α
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
= ‖z∗‖2 =
√
dλ ∗(n,d)
then we have ‖α‖2 =
√
dλ ∗(n,d)√
n . Since, the budget we defined is `1 norm of vector α , thus
here we assume each element in α is the same, then we will have ‖α‖1=
√
d‖α‖2 =
dλ ∗(n,d)√
n . Thus we have the MB as:
MB =
dλ ∗(n,d)√
n
Notice that the MB is a conservative estimation of an adversary’s ability to influence
the data.
3.2.3 Evaluation of regularizer
One can notice that we have four possible models by combining the two players’ loss
function with different regularizers. ‖w‖p and ‖α‖p can either be `1 or `2 norm. In
the case of ‖w‖p = ‖w‖2 and ‖α‖p = ‖α‖2, we denote this model as Game(`d2 `a2).
Similarly we denote the other three sparse models as Game(`d2 `
a
1), Game(`
d
1 `
a
2) and
Game(`d1 `
a
1). We denote a regular classifier with `2 and `1 regularizer as Regular-`2
and Regular-`1 respectively. Experiments of the non zero-sum game are reported in
Section 3.3.4.
3.3 Experiments
We now report on the experiments carried out to evaluate the effectiveness of the pro-
posed model in adversarial settings. Our main focus is to compare the effectiveness of
our game-theoertic model with `1 and `2 regularizers under both sparse and dense fea-
ture attacks. We use the BMRM [75] solver for logistic loss and CVX [37] for square
and hinge loss. All the data and code is available for result replication1.
1https://www.dropbox.com/sh/tq8gbzzh59d0nu2/AAAB9RlkrKRaufyI2DzNo90ja
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3.3.1 Data set
3.3.1.1 (USPS) Digit Image data set
The US Postal Service (USPS) data set [38] consists of gray scaled images of hand-
written digits from 0 to 9. Each image is of the size 16× 16 (dimension 256). In the
experiments, we pick pairs of digits to illustrate how an adversary can manipulate one
digit (positive class) to look like another (negative class).
3.3.1.2 (Malinglist) Mailinglist data set
The data set is a collection of 128,117 emails arranged in a chronological order. The
emails are extracted from a publicly available mailing lists and are augmented with
spam emails from Bruce Guenter’s spam trap of the same time period (01/04/1999−
31/05/2006). This data set has been used in previous adversarial learning research [15].
The data set obtained is an inverted table of all the words and symbols in the original
spam emails. We carried out feature selection by applying kernel-PCA map [71, 14]
which is defined as:
φPCA : x 7→ Λ 12
+
V T [k(x1,x), ...,k(xn,x)]T . (3.4)
Here V is the column matrix of eigenvectors of kernel matrix K, where K is the dot
product of data points k(x,x) = xT x. We use the first 2000 instances (in chronological
order) to formulate the 2000×2000 kernel matrix. Λ is the diagonal eigenvalue matrix
of K such that K =VΛV T , and Λ
1
2
+
represents the pseudo-inverse of Λ
1
2 .
We use kernel PCA to reduce the dimensionality of the feature space from 266,378
to 50 dimensions. The 50 features are significant enough to fit a regular logistic classi-
fier with an F-measure score of 0.967 on the training data. The model was trained with
the original imbalanced data in order to reflect the true class distribution.
3.3.1.3 Spambase data set
We also used the popular “Spambase” data set [79] to test the robustness of different
classifiers [29]. The data set has 4601 both spam and non-spam emails and has 57
features, out of which 48 are the frequencies of key words, 6 are percentage of key
words.
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3.3.2 Why sparse feature attack for the adversary?
In this section we illustrate three main insights with experimental validations of why a
rational adversary will apply sparse feature attack.
3.3.2.1 A more realistic behavior
With the help of the USPS digit data set we demonstrate why a rational adversary is
likely to mount a sparse attack. We select digit 7 and 9 to be the binary classification
data set. Now we assume an adversary is able to control and manipulate 7 so that it will
be misclassified. We first train a regular classifier with `2 regularizer, then the two types
of attacks (`1 and `2) are performed on the data set. We show the misclassified 7 from
each of the two types of attacks in Figure 3.1.
An example of the original digit 7 and 9 is shown in Figures 3.1(a,d). Under a
sparse feature attack only one pixel is modified (Figure 3.1c) and that is sufficient to
misclassify the image. It turns out that the pixel manipulated by the adversary is the
most important feature to distinguish between 7 an 9. On the other hand a dense fea-
ture attack is shown in (Figure 3.1b) results in several pixels being modified but with
a lower intensity. Thus with a sparse feature an adversary is able to make minimal
observablechanges to the “spam” and circumvent the spam filter.
3.3.2.2 Leads to better classifier
Here we study the relationship between the performance of a game-theoretic classi-
fier with varying attack strength, i.e. Cost as defined in the model. When we train a
classifier on an tempered data set, in our case manipulated positive samples, it is nec-
essary to ask how much will the new classifier differ from a regular classifier trained
on original data set? To answer this question, we evaluate the classifiers using the false
negative to false positive rate. In the Non-Zero sum game model, we have assumed that
an adversary will manipulate the positive data so that it will go across the classifica-
tion boundary. Therefore, the classifier learned in this case will move the classification
boundary backward to the direction of negative samples. Thus, we would expect a clas-
sifier with lower false negative rate, at the same time, a higher false positive rate. The
attack strength decides how far the boundary will move towards the negative samples.
Thus we can vary the attack strength and examine the false negative rate and false posi-
tive rate. The model with a lower false negative rate is preferred. In this experiment we
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test the Non-Zero sum game with classifier using `2 norm, while the adversary uses `2
or `1 norm. We select the first 400 samples from the Malinglist data set as training data,
which represent the older emails. For test data, we select the last 4000 samples from
the data set. As shown in Figure 3.4, with the same false positive rate, classifier with `1
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Figure 3.4: When adversary is assumed to apply sparse feature attack, the learned clas-
sifier has better performance.
regularizer has a lower false negative rate. The experiment illustrates that by modeling
an adversary with `1 regularizer we get overall better performance.
3.3.2.3 The game converges faster with less cost and feature modifications
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Figure 3.5: The game with sparse feature attack reaches a stable state much faster
compared to a dense attack and is associated with lower cost.
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Figure 3.6: The game with sparse feature attack identify and modifies a limited number
of features, in this case, 13 out of 50 features.
As one can anticipate that if we let the game play repeat indefinitely, it will reach
a state where the positive and negative data almost overlap. However we would expect
the classifier learned from such a game will have the least performance. In other words,
this is an extreme case of overestimating the adversary. Still we conduct experiment to
estimate the adversarial cost for reaching such a state. Since we have already concluded
that a sparse attack is a better model for the adversary, we expect the adversary with
sparse feature attack will achieve the overlap state with less cost compared to the one
with dense feature attack.
We compare the the number of iterations required for Game(`d2 `
a
2) and Game(`
d
2 `
a
1)
converge on the mailinglist data set . The Cost of the adversary is evaluated by accumu-
lating the `1 norm of α in each step. We also evaluate the number of features modified
under the sparse feature attack model Game(`d2 `
a
1) as a function of number of iterations.
For Game(`d2 `
a
2), we know it is likely to modify all the features in each step.
Figure 3.5 shows the cumulative cost of the adversary as a function of the number
of iterations in the game. It is clear that Game(`d2 `
a
1), i.e., the game where the adversary
carries out a sparse feature attack converges faster to reach a stable state compared to
the dense game Game(`d2 `
a
2). From Figure 3.6, we found the number of features being
modified will also converge to a number far less than the total number of features. This
again suggests that modeling an adversary using an `1 regularizer is a better reflection
of reality.
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3.3.3 Why `1 regularizer for data miner?
As reported in Section 3.2.1, the lasso problem is equivalent to a robust regression
problem. Using a regularizer has always been considered as a method to penalize the
weights to achieve better generalization. Here we find that `1 regularizer is not only a
technique to prevent overfitting, but also a method for building more robust classifica-
tion boundaries. This property itself indicates that classifier learnt with an `1 regularizer
is more robust in the presence of certain data manipulations. Therefore, in the case of
an adversarial environment, a classifier with `1 regularizer is preferred.
Existing literatures [68, 4] indicates that in a classical classification environment,
when `1 regularizer is applied, there will always be a trade-off between the enforced
sparsity and the accuracy obtained. However, depending on the data set itself, the over-
all performance of an `1 regularized classifier can sometimes beat an `2 regularized
classifier [65] in terms of both bias and variance. A deeper discussion of this issue is
beyond the scope of this research. Here, we compare the performance of the two clas-
sifier under the condition that the distribution of the test data is altered by an adversary.
To investigate the influence of the adversarial manipulation, we start by looking at
how the loss of a data miner is increased by the adversary according to the loss function:
L(w)=
n
∑
i
log(1+e−yi〈w
T ,xi+α〉)+λw‖w‖p =
n
∑
i
log(1+e−yi〈w
T ,xi〉+〈wT ,α〉)+λw‖w‖p
As we can see from this equation, the adversarial influence is captured only in the factor
〈wT ,α〉. This is the dot product of the feature weight vector and the manipulation vec-
tor, which can be expressed as: w1α1+w2α2+ ...+wdαd . One should notice that when
both of the two vectors are dense vectors, 〈wT ,α〉 will always be non-zero. On the
other hand, when both the vectors are sparse vectors, 〈wT ,α〉 will have a high probabil-
ity of being zero. When this factor is zero, the influence of adversary also disappears.
Thus, we can conclude that when adversary is modeled to use a sparse feature attack,
data miner should apply `1 regularization to reduce the adversary’s effect. This analy-
sis can be easily generalized into higher dimensions. We can also hypothesise that the
adversarial influence of the sparse classifier has a negative correlation with its sparsity.
To test the hypothesis we conduct experiments to investigate whether classifier with `1
regularizer have better results under the sparse feature attack. We generate a data set
which is adversarially transformed by an adversary who can only manipulate a limited
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Algorithm 2 Robustness evaluation under sparse feature attack
Input: Original positive data set {xi,yi}nposi=1 , Feature weights w ∈ Rd+1, Number of
features to be changed {c ∈ N|(0< c≤ d)} . Attack strength {δ ∈ R|(0< δ < 1)}
Output: Accuracy of classifier on {x∗i ,yi}nposi=1
1: // Randomly select c features of the data and index in vector α = {0< ak ≤ d}ck=1
2: for i = 1 = i : npos do
3: x∗i ← xi,k← 1
4: while k <= c do
5: if wak > 0 then
6: x∗ak = x
∗
ak(1−δ )
7: else
8: if wk == 0 then
9: do nothing
10: else
11: x∗ak = x
∗
ak(1+δ )
12: end if
13: end if
14: k = k+1
15: end while
16: end for
17: Evaluate classifier (using w) on changed data set {x∗i ,yi}nposi=1
number of features. We then test the two initial classifiers with different regularizers on
the transformed data set. The detailed procedure is described in Algorithm 2.
Now we report on experiments to compare the performance of `1 and `2 classifiers
in a non-game setting where the classifiers were subject to feature attacks but without
having an opportunity to respond. We use Spambase data set for this experiment. To
simulate the attack, we randomly select twenty percent of the number of features to be
changed, i.e. we set c = 20%× d. We vary the attack strength δ from 0 to 40% with
step size of 0.2%.
As shown in Figure 3.7, both the classifiers start (in terms of accuracy) at nearly
the same place but the classifier with `1 regularizer deteriorates at a much slower rate
compared to the classifier with an `2 regularizer. This clearly demonstrates that the `1
classifier is more robust and is consistent with the theoretical observation that the `1
classifier is equivalent to robust classification.
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(a) F-measure comparison.
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(b) AUC value comparison.
Figure 3.7: Regular-`1 is more robust in both F-measure and AUC value compared to
Regular-`2.
Table 3.2: The classifier achieves best performance when the Cost is close to 1×MB.
Step F measure on future test data Average $Cost$
30/04/2000-
31/05/2001
30/04/2001-
31/05/2002
30/04/2002-
31/05/2003
30/04/2003-
31/05/2004
30/04/2004-
31/05/2005
30/04/2005-
31/05/2006
1 0.973 0.975 0.966 0.942 0.945 0.931 0.955 0.000 ×MB
2 0.972 0.975 0.967 0.944 0.945 0.932 0.956 0.137 ×MB
3 0.971 0.974 0.966 0.938 0.940 0.929 0.953 0.300 ×MB
4 0.972 0.974 0.969 0.944 0.946 0.932 0.956 0.444 ×MB
5 0.969 0.975 0.970 0.951 0.952 0.935 0.959 0.586 ×MB
6 0.971 0.974 0.972 0.948 0.955 0.936 0.959 0.759 ×MB
7 0.970 0.975 0.971 0.949 0.951 0.936 0.959 0.951 ×MB
8 0.970 0.973 0.970 0.954 0.952 0.938 0.960 1.115 ×MB
9 0.968 0.973 0.967 0.952 0.945 0.933 0.956 1.321 ×MB
10 0.969 0.973 0.967 0.954 0.952 0.932 0.958 1.495 ×MB
3.3.4 Evaluation of the budget MB
The budget MB of an adversary should be lower bounded by the value of the regular-
izer obtained using cross-validation. This is because, the value obtained from cross-
validation is assumed to give best generalization performance. We can interpret the test
data as a data set generated by an adversary who is restricted to use the same underlying
probability distribution that generated the training data. As we noted in Section 3.2.1,
using `1 regularization is equivalent to solving the robust regression problem.
We evaluate Algorithm 1 with the sparse model Game(`d1`
a
1). To study performance
of the learned classifier as a function of Cost, we repeatedly ran the game model until
the Cost had substantially exceeded MB. We show the performance of the classifiers
learned from the first 10 steps in Table 3.2. We first observe, at step 1, the regular
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classifier learnt with 0 adversarial Cost has the best performance on the near future
data. While classifier learned with large adversarial Cost has better performance on
data sets further in the future. We also notice when the Cost is close to MB, the average
F-measure is close to its highest value. Thus we can conclude empirically that MB value
derived in 3.2.2 is an appropriate budget for the adversary.
3.3.5 Evaluating logistic loss with `d2
Here we compare the game-theoretic and regular classifier when the data miner (d) uses
`d2 regularizer under logistic loss. More specifically, the three models are denoted as:
Regular-`2, Game(`d2 `
a
2) and Game(`
d
2 `
a
1). We evaluate all the three models in terms
of F-measure and AUC-value. The results are shown in Figure 3.8. We have further
summarized the results in Table 3.3. We can conclude that game-theoretic classifiers
deteriorate at a much slower rate on future data than the regular classifier. On the
near future data, the regular classifier have a slightly better performance and this can
be expected as the game-theoretic classifier are generalizing for better performance
on future data. On the other hand, the AUC which measures the overall performance
(without considering the time dimension), is nearly equal for all the three approaches.
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Figure 3.8: Game(`d2 `
a
1)model outperforms Regular-`2 classifier in terms of F-measure
data in further into the future.
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Table 3.3: Data miner modeled with `2 regularizer. Game-theoretic classifier perform
better on data further into the future.
AUC F-measure
Jan 00 - April 03 April 03 - May 06
Regular-`2 0.96 0.968 0.936
Game(`d2`
a
2) 0.95 0.962 0.939
Game(`d2`
a
1) 0.96 0.962 0.953
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Figure 3.9: Game(`d1 `
a
2) and Game(`
d
1 `
a
1) both outperform the initial classifier with `1
regularizer in terms of both F-measure.
Table 3.4: Sparse model Game(`d1 `
a
1) achieves the best performance.
AUC F-measure
Jan 00 to April 03 April 03 to May 06
Regular-`1 0.95 0.961 0.922
Game(`d1`
a
2) 0.96 0.964 0.951
Game(`d1`
a
1) 0.96 0.970 0.955
3.3.6 Evaluating logistic loss with `d1
Here we compare the game-theoretic and regular classifier when the data miner (d)
uses `d1 regularizer under logistic loss. More specifically, the three models are denoted
as: Regular-`1, Game(`d1 `
a
2) and Game(`
d
1 `
a
1). The results are shown in Figure 3.9
and Table 3.4. Surprisingly the F-measure results of the two game-theoretic classifiers
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outperform the regular classifier for almost the whole time span. In other words, the
game-theoretic classifiers are both robust to near and far future test data. Furthermore, it
is worth noting that the game-theoretic classifier Game(`d1 `
a
1) has the best performance.
A similar results hold for the AUC-value as shown in Table 3.4.
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(a) Logistic loss as the loss function
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(b) Square loss as the loss function
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(c) Hinge loss as the loss function
Figure 3.10: Sparse model Game(`d1 `
a
1) has the best F-measure results on data further
into the future.
3.3.7 Comparison of `d1 and `
d
2 on logistic loss
Here compare `d1 and `
d
2 both on game-theoretic and regular classifiers. We also com-
pare with Liu et al. [52]. From Figure 3.10a, it is clear that the use of `d1 regularizer
significantly outperforms `d2 on data both near and further into the future.
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3.3.8 Comparison with other methods
Table 3.5: Square loss as the loss function, Game(`d1 `
a
1) performs best on data further
into the future.
F-measure
Jan 00 to April 03 April 03 to May 06
Regular-`1 0.953 0.922
Game(`d1 `
a
1) 0.952 0.937
Liu et al 0.935 0.926
Table 3.6: Hinge loss as the loss function, Game(`d1 `
a
1) performs best on all the future
data.
F-measure
Jan 00 to April 03 April 03 to May 06
Regular-`1 0.968 0.932
Game(`d1 `
a
1) 0.969 0.941
Liu et al 0.933 0.927
Zhou et al 0.939 0.936
We now compare the two proposed game-theoretic classifier but trained using square
and hinge loss functions. The results are shown in Figure 3.10b and 3.10c respectively.
In both cases, we also compare with Liu et al[52]. For hinge loss, we also compare
with free range attack model from Zhou et al. [90], where the adversary is allowed to
manipulate the data with the budget MB.
We first notice that classifier learnt from model Game(`d1 `
a
1) is significantly more
robust to future data in for both the two loss functions. The model of Liu et al[52] and
Zhou et al. [90] exhibits similar phenomenon: they both have reasonable performance
on data further into the future than the regular classifier but suffer significantly on near
future data.
3.4 Summary
In many prediction environments including spam email and fraud detection, it has been
observed that an adversarial phenomenon causes the prediction performance to deteri-
orate over time. This has resulted in a new class of machine learning methods, known
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as adversarial learning, which are robust in such settings. In this chapter we posit that
a rational adversary is likely to employ a sparse feature attack, i.e., selectively change
the features of the spam, in order to circumvent the classifier. Such an approach will
not only cost less but will result in high spam utility, i.e., minimal changes are made on
the spam in order to beat the spam detector. We model sparse feature attacks using an
`1 regularizer. Our results clearly demonstrate that modeling an adversary as engaging
in a sparse feature attack can be used to design more robust classifiers.
Chapter 4
Tikhonov or Lasso Regularization:
Which is Better and When
This chapter is based on the following publication:
Wang, Fei, Sanjay Chawla, and Wei Liu. Tikhonov or Lasso Regularization: Which
Is Better and When. Tools with Artificial Intelligence (ICTAI), 2013 IEEE 25th Interna-
tional Conference on. IEEE, 2013.
4.1 Motivation
Crucial properties of a model like robustness and convergence are often related to the
type of regualrizer the model use. One interesting problem addressed in this thesis is
that practitioners of machine learning and data mining are confronted with the follow-
ing situation. They receive or are given a large data set with millions of records and
thousands of features and are interested in carrying out some form of regression, clas-
sification or ranking. For example, researchers working in the consumer internet space
may be asked to predict the click through rates in the context of user, publisher and ad-
vertiser features [40]. In bio-medical settings, researchers want to predict whether MRI
images can be mapped to various forms of disorder [87]. In a health insurance setting
the task is to estimate the claim cost given information about patients and providers
[57]. In all the above examples a practitioner is likely to conduct the following steps:
(i) load and clean the data (ii) use a learning package to carry out some preliminary
analysis and check the accuracy metrics; (iii) start iterating by tweaking the features
40
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Figure 4.1: A map [left to right] to guide practitioners in their choice of a regularizer
for supervised learning tasks
and the different types of regularizers available in the learning package. In this chapter,
we study the different properties of the regularizer and show the principle of choosing
it properly.
4.2 Contributions
While many of these results are known and scattered in the literature. Our contributions
are summarized as follows:
• We first give insights of the difference between `1 and `2 regularizer through a
simple analysis and thus show that why `1 regularizer can result in sparse results.
• We provide a more complete analysis of algorithmic stability based on Xu et al.
[85] Further we verify this with sufficient experiments.
• We provide a concise proof of algorithmic robustness of `1 regularization. We
also verify the resulting claim with ample experiments.
• Then, we show how the existence of the Safe Rule could damage the fitting ac-
curacy of a `1 regularized model. This is also supported by a wide range of
experiments.
• Last but not least, we bring them together under a common mathematical frame-
work and organize them using the decision map shown in Figure 4.1.
Several, somewhat surprising, conclusions can be drawn:
• If the data generating process is non-stationary (not stable), the `2 regularizer will
result in a more stable solution compared to the `1 regularizer.
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• The `1 regularizer is substantially more robust to noise in the data sensing or
capturing mechanism.
• If most of the features in the data have weak correlation with the dependent vari-
able then the use of `2 regularizer will result in superior prediction accuracy com-
pared to `1.
• Finally, there is a strong relationship between the shape of the data, which relates
to the volume and the dimension, and the choice of the regularizer. The shape of
the data can be characterized as the ratio of number of data points to number of
features
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: In Section 4.3 we introduce the
notation and specify the scope of the problem. Related work is presented in Section
4.4. We describe the “Decision Map” in detail in Section 4.5. We extensively evaluate
the “Decision Map” in Section 4.6. Finally we conclude the chaper in Section 4.7 with
a summary and directions for future work.
4.3 Notation and Setup
A generic supervised learning problem has the following formulation
f (λ ) = min
w
n
∑
i=1
l(yi,wT xi)+λΩ(w), (4.1)
where l() stands for the loss function, w ∈ Rd is the feature weight vector learned from
the training data xi ∈ Rd, i = 1, ...,n and λΩ() is the regularizer with parameter λ . For
simplicity, we can either subsume the intercept term by appending a unit feature, i.e.,
x ≡ [1,x] or by assuming all variables are centered. Common forms of loss functions
(and their conjugate functions) l(yi,wT xi) are given in Table 4.1. Common regularizers
can be `1 or `2 which corresponds to ‖w‖1 and ‖w‖22 respectively. In this chapter we will
focus on the square loss for understanding the mathematical properties of the solutions
while in the experiments we will use logistic loss to validate our results. However,
since our focus is on how the choice of the regularizer impacts the resulting solution,
our results are completely general and can be framed at a more abstract level by using
the loss function and its corresponding conjugate function as shown in Table 4.1.
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`(yi,wT xi) `∗(yi,u)
Square 12(yi−wT xi)2 12u2+uyi
Logistic log(1+ exp(−yiwT xi)) (1+uyi) log(1+uyi)
−uyi log(−uyi)
Hinge (1− yiwT xi)+ uyi×1−uyi∈[0,1]
Table 4.1: Commonly used loss functions and their conjugate functions. Since our
focus is on the impact of the regularization, our results are general and are applicable to
other loss functions by matching them with their appropriate conjugate function.
4.4 Related Work
The algorithmic overhead of solving `1 regularized systems is larger than for `2 because
of the non-differentiability of the `1 norm. By analyzing the dual of a least-square
regression problem with an `1 regularizer, El Ghaoui et al. [34] proposed a SafeRule
to prune features which will, for a given value of λ have zero weights. A contribution
of our work is to show the consequences of this property on the relative accuracy of
the `1 and `2 solutions. Using SafeRule as a motivation, Tibishirani et al. [76] has
proposed Strong Rules which are more aggressive in pruning features. However, they
are known to lead to inconsistent models at least in theoretically constructed cases.
Andrew Ng [61] has compared `1 and `2 regularizers in the context of number of
irrelevant features. He has shown that with `1 regularization, the number of training
samples required for learning a good model grows logarithmically in the number of
irrelevant features. With `2 regularization, on the other hand, the size of the training data
needs to grow linearly in the number of irrelevant features. Thus if only a few number of
features are relevant and the size of training data is relatively small, `1 regularization is
preferred. Later developments in compressed sensing also show that only a logarithmic
number of sensing measurements are required to recover a signal using `1 minimization.
Robustness and stability are different properties related to data capturing process,
the data generating mechanism and also algorithms. In a theoretical work, Xu et al.
[85] have recently demonstrated that solving a `1 regularized least square problem is
equivalent to solving a least square problem with a worst case bounded perturbation in
the training data. This suggests that `1 regularization should be the method of choice
when the data capturing process generates data which has a low signal to noise ratio. An
example is the data generated by EEG probes [69] for understanding the functionality
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of the brain. Xu et al. [85] also prove a “no free lunch” theorem showing that the `1
regularized models are not stable. In another work by Zhang et al. [89] showed that col-
laborative representation (CR) instead of `1 regularizer truly improves the classification
accuracy.
Finally, it is important to note that there has been work which combines the use of
both `1 and `2 regularizers. For example, the elastic net regularizer [92] can be used
to apply sparsity at the level of groups of features. Consider microarray applications
[67], genes often work together to regulate proteins and their expression levels tend to
be highly correlated. However, for a given task only few groups of genes are relevant.
Thus the elastic net method tends to sparsify at the group level but reduces the norm of
the feature weights inside groups.
4.5 Decision Map
In this section, we will first investigate properties of the `1 regularization in terms of
Stability and Robustness. Then we look into the properties of the data in terms of
correlation and shape. These analysis will form the basis of the decision map shown in
Figure 1.
4.5.1 Algorithmic stability
algorithmic stability is a well studied problem and has been used to re-derive classical
generalization bounds [12, 56]. Intuitively a learning algorithm is stable, when if it
is trained on two similar data sets, the output models should be similar. The formal
definition of uniform stability is defined as [12, 85]:
Definition 1: An algorithm L has uniform stability bound of βn with respect to the
loss function l if the following holds
∀D ∈Z n,∀i ∈ {1, · · ·,n},‖l(LD, ·)− l(LD\i, ·)‖∞ ≤ βn. (4.2)
Here Z n is the sample space, D is a given training sample, LD\i stands for the learned
solution with the ith sample removed from D, l(LD\i, ·) stands for the loss of the solution
on any given test data.
We provide a simplified analysis of the results presented by Xu et al. [85]. Again
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consider the one-dimensional case. Assume
w∗ = argmin
w
n
∑
i=1
l(yi,w · xi)+ |w|, (4.3)
now consider the case where the feature x is replicated, for example, an data point (xi,yi)
becomes ((xi,xi),yi). the loss function will become
(w∗1,w
∗
2) = argmin
w1,w2
n
∑
i=1
l(yi,w1 · xi+w2 · xi)+ |w1|+ |w2|. (4.4)
Now we show that w∗1 +w
∗
2 = w
∗. The key is to notice that the data corresponding to
both w1 and w2 are identical. According to the stationarity condition of the Lagrangian
of lasso [36]
XTi u
∗ ∈

{λ} if w∗i > 0
{−λ} if w∗i < 0
[−λ ,λ ] if w∗i = 0
, i = 1, ...d, (4.5)
we see that w1 and w2 have the same sign. Equation 4.4 can be expressed as
(w∗1,w
∗
2) = argmin
w1,w2
n
∑
i=1
l(yi,w1 · xi+w2 · xi)+ |w1+w2|. (4.6)
Now consider a new data point ((0,z),0) which is added to D. This leads to a new term
in the loss function.
n
∑
i=1
l(yi,w1 · xi+w2 · xi)+ l(0,0+w2 · z)+ |w1+w2| (4.7)
Now, (w∗,0) is the optimal solution of Equation 4.7. However, when the point (0,0,z)
is removed, (0,w∗) is an optimal solution. Thus we have showed that for `1 regularizer,
βn ≥ w∗z and the lower bound can increase arbitrarily.
4.5.2 Robustness
A learning algorithm is robust if the model it generates is resistant to bounded perturba-
tions in the data. Robust learning algorithms is an active area of research and the robust
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linear regression problem is defined as
min
w∈Rd
{max
|z|≤λ
‖y− (x+ z)w‖2}. (4.8)
The key insight about robust regression as defined in [85] can be derived from consid-
ering the one-dimensional case. For example, we first notice that
max
|z|≤λ
|y− (x+ z)w| ≤ |y− xw|+ c|w|.
Now consider a specific z∗ =−λ sgn(w)sgn(y− xw). Clearly |z∗| ≤ λ . Furthemore
max
|z|≤λ
|y− (x+ z)w| ≥ |y− (x+ z∗)w|
= |y− xw|+ |λ sgn(w)sgn(y− xw)w|
= |y− xw|+λ |w|,
thus
max
|z|≤λ
|y− (x+ z)w|= |(y− xw)|+λ |w|. (4.9)
This generalizes to
min
w∈Rd
{max
|z|≤λ
‖y− (x+ z)w‖2}= min
w∈Rd
‖y−xw‖2+λ‖w‖1 (4.10)
This means solving a `1 regularized least square problem is equivalent to solving a worst
case linear square problem with noise |z| ≤ λ .
4.5.3 Correlation
SafeRule itself has only been considered in terms of feature pruning technique, here,
we discuss its influence on the accuracy of the learned model. One can observe that
Equation 2.16 of SafeRule only depends on the correlation of the independent and
dependent variable. Loosely speaking, for a given Xi, the lower the correlation, the
higher the possibility this variable will be pruned. This property makes it undesirable
in the case where all the features are weakly correlated with the dependent variable. i.e.
|yT Xi| ≤ τ for i= 1, ...d, where τ is a small value. In this scenario all the weak features
should be utilized to learn a model, however because of the SafeRule, all the features
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are likely to be pruned with `1 regularizer. The `2 regularizer on the other hand will be
able to combine all the features to produce potentially more accurate model.
Suppose we have a sample set D = (y,X), where Xi are all weakly correlated with
y. Further suppose w∗`2 is the optimal fit with `2 regularization and we define yr as the
residual on training data.
yr = y−XT w∗`2
We can then add a new feature α which has no correlation with Xi while still weakly
correlated with y. Define the new sample set as D∗ = (yr,α), and we have the following
minimization problem:
f (wα) = min
wα
‖yr−αT wα‖22+
λ
2
‖wα‖22.
One should notice α is correlated with yr, i.e. αT yr 6= 0. Suppose w∗α is the optimal fit,
we want to prove that
‖yr−αT w∗α‖22 < ‖yr‖22. (4.11)
The proof is as follow: We first notice that f (w∗α) is upper bounded by ‖yr‖22, i.e.,
f (w∗α)≤ ‖yr‖22 = f (0).
As f (wα) is a convex minimization problem, we have :
f (w∗α)< ‖yr‖22 = f (0) if: f
′
(0) 6= 0
Now: f
′
(0) = 2(yr−αT 0)α+λ0 = αT yr 6= 0.
Thus:
f (w∗α) =
λ
2
‖w∗α‖22+‖yr−αT w∗α‖22 < ‖yr‖22
‖yr−αT w∗α‖22 < ‖yr‖22.
Here we can conclude that the new weak feature α improved the fit when using L2
regularization.
In the case of L1 regularization, since the new feature α is weakly correlated with y,
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it is quite possible that the SafeRule, in this case |XTi y|< λ , will ignore that feature.
Thus w∗α = 0, and we have
‖yr−αT w∗α‖22 = ‖yr‖22,
which does not lead to any improvement at all.
In the experiment section we formulate artificial data set ‘AllWeak’ with all features
weakly correlated with dependent variable and show that in this case `2 achieves better
accuracy.
4.5.4 Shape
[61] studied the properties of `1 and `2 regularizer in the presence of irrelevant features,
which is similar to few features are highly correlated with dependent variable. As it
indicated that in this case, a well learned `2 regularizer needs far more training samples.
This also indicates that for `1 regularizer, if the number of training data is sufficient,
for a given λ , the number of zero feature weights also achieves maximum. This will be
clearly visible in the experiment section.
4.5.5 Decision map
Based on the four factors discussed in the previous four sections, we propose the “de-
cision tree” map as depicted in Figure 4.1. Generally speaking, a practitioner should
first consider the data generating process. When the data source is not stable, then
one should stop analysis and choose `2 regularizer. When the data is stable, we then
consider the data capture process. Data captured through instruments like sensors are
intrinsically not robust and in this case we should use `1 regularizer to compensate the
offset by the date. Then, if the data is also robust, we consider the correlation between
dependent and independent variables. Due to the existence of the SafeRule, we know
that `2 regularizer will be better for data sets composed of features all weakly correlated
with dependent variable. Then, when data sets have some strongly correlated feature
dependent variable pairs, we consider the shape of the data set. As indicated by the
study of [61], for large number of training data, `2 and `1 can both learn well. However,
the SafeRule will still come into offset. Thus, in the case of N P, where N is the
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number of training sample P is the dimension of the data, One should apply `2 regu-
larizer. For the case N ' P and N < P, the number of training sample will be far from
enough to training a `2 regularized model well. Thus we should apply `1 regularizer in
this case.
4.6 Experiments
We present our experimental setup and results to evaluate the decision map shown in
Figure 4.1 here. Note that all experiments used the binary classification problem as a
prototypical data mining task where the use of regularization is important. However, all
our conclusions should hold for other tasks including regression and ranking. Again,
our conclusions hold for other loss functions including the hinge loss. After some
careful deliberation we selected the Vowpal Wabbit (VW) [49] package for both `1
and `2 regularization. Our decision was primarily motivated by the fact that, as data
set size increases, VW scales gracefully in both `1 and `2 situations. However, VW has
several tuning parameters and understanding the full implications of different parameter
settings can lead to a combinatorial explosion of the experimental space. Finally, all
experiments were carried out on a platform with Intel core i5 processor and 4GB RAM.
4.6.1 Data Sets
We constructed three synthetic data sets and used four real data sets:
• ‘AUSUSD’ is the currency exchange rate between Australian dollar and US dollar
during the time period (01/03/2007−01/03/2013) [6].
• ‘AllWeak’ is a synthetically constructed data set. It has one hundred features
which are all weakly correlated with the dependent variable y. Also the features
are partitioned into 50 pairs where features with a pair a strongly correlated with
each other.
• ‘FewStrong’ is a synthetically created data set composed of hundred features with
five of them have a correlation with dependent variable y as 0.1 and the rest are
again weakly correlated with y.
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• ‘MajorityIrrelevant’ is a synthetic data set with one hundred features with only
ten features that are correlated with dependent variable y.
• ‘Mailinglist’ is a real data set which consists of publicly available emails from
mailing lists and spam emails from Bruce Guenter’s spam trap during the time
period (01/04/1999−31/05/2006). The transformed features are not correlated
with each other and each of them is strongly correlated with the dependent vari-
able.
• ‘Spambase’ is also a spam email data set [29]. Spam e-mails came from their
postmaster and individuals who had filed spam and non-spam e-mails from work
and personal e-mails. Most of the features (48 out of 57) are frequency of key
words. In this data set some of the features are highly correlated with the depen-
dent variable.
• ‘WEBSPAM’ consists of link-based features computed from the web graph [86].
The features capture network properties including in-degree, out-degree, page
rank, edge reciprocity.
A summary of the data set is shown in Table 4.2. All features of the data sets are
standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
Data Set Name Samples Features Type
WEBSPAM-UK2007 114,529 40 Real
Mailinglist 128,117 50 Real
Spambase 4,601 57 Real
AllWeak 2000 100 Synthetic
FewStrong 2000 100 Synthetic
MajorityIrrelevant 2000 100 Synthetic
AUDUSD 2000 100 Real
Table 4.2: Four real and three synthetically constructed data sets were used for the
experiments. More detail about the data sets is in the text.
4.6.2 Stability and Robustness
To evaluate the impact of stability and robustness on the regularizers we proceed as
follows. We first describe the stability experiment. Suppose X is a training data set.
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Let the model learnt by using the `1 and `2 regularizer on X be denoted as w1 and
w2 respectively. We randomly remove one data point from X and reconstructed the
model. Denote the model from the i-th run as w1−i and w2−i. For example, w1−i are the
weights of classifier when the i-th point is removed and the model is trained using the
`1 regularizer.
Now form two sets DS1 and DS2 as
DS1 = {‖w1−i−w1‖2 | i = 1 . . .100} (4.12)
DS2 = {‖w2−i−w2‖2 | i = 1 . . .100}. (4.13)
We have plotted the distribution of both DS1 and DS2 using three data sets: AllWeak,
SpamBase and AUDUSD. and the results are shown in Figure 4.2. It is clear from the
plots that the values of DS2 are tightly concentrated while those of DS1 are more spread
out. This is especially obvious for the financial data AUDUSD, which has an unstable
data generating process. This confirms our hypothesis that `2 regularizers result in more
stable models than `1.
To test for robustness we need to proceed in a different fashion. We again begin with
a data set X . On each separate run i we add bounded noise ∆Xi. Let w1 be the model
on X using the `1 regularizer and w2 using the `2 regularizer. For each i we compute
the AUC for X +∆Xi for each of the regularizers. Thus f ∆1 (i) = AUC(X +∆Xi|w1) and
likewise for f2(i). Let f ∆2 (i) = AUC(X+∆Xi|w2), i.e., the accuracy of the model trained
on the data set X +∆Xi. Like in the case of stability, we form the sets
DR1 = { f ∆1 (i)− f1(i) | i = 1 . . .1000} (4.14)
DR2 = { f ∆2 (i)− f2(i) | i = 1 . . .1000}. (4.15)
The results of the distribution of both DR1 and DR2 are shown in Figure 4.3 and clearly
show that the data points of `1 are more tightly concentrated compared to `2. This again
confirms that when the data capturing process is noisy, then `1 leads to more robust
classifiers compared to `2.
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Figure 4.2: (c) shows the Exchange rate of AUDUSD in six years. One can notice
that the data is rather not stable. (a),(b),(d) clearly show that distribution results of `2
regularizer has lower standard deviation and thus more stable,
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Figure 4.3: Robustness: The figures indicate that distribution results of `1 regularizer
has lower standard deviation and thus more robust.
4.6.3 Shape
This experiment evaluate how many samples are required before the learning algorithm
can determine if the features in a given data set are irrelevant. Figure 4.4 shows that
the norm of the irrelevant features using `1 regularizer converges much faster to 0 as a
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function of the number of training points compared to `2.
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Figure 4.4: Shape: The figures indicate that `1 regularization ignores the irrelevant
features with much fewer training samples.
4.6.4 Correlation and Shape
In this section we investigate the influence of correlation and again the shape of the data
on the choice of regularizers. Here we use all the four data sets and all the experiments
are averaged over 20 runs. We only consider the accuracy of the model (as measured
by AUC) and omit factors like running time. VW has almost similar time complexity
for both `1 and `2 regularization.
In our experiments we vary the size of the training data and the regularizer value λ
for the two different models. In all cases we start with just twenty instances and then
in each step increase the number of instances by a step size of thirty. The reason we
start from small data sets is to understand the impact of the regularizer when data is
limited. This is partly because the `1 and `2 regularizers can be interpreted as Lapla-
cian and Gaussian priors. For large data sets, the prior effect is often (but not always)
subsumed by the (likelihood term) of the model. We also vary λ between a small range
[10−4,60−4]. Again this choice was determined by the fact that we wanted to gauge the
influence of the regularizer in a transition zone.
Before we describe the results in details we want to provide a small guide to under-
stand Figure 4.5 which contains four plots organized as four by four table. Each row
corresponds to one data set. In all the plots the y-axis is always the AUC value. In the
first two columns we measure the impact of different values of λ ’s as we increase the
training data size. In column three and four, the roles of λ and the training data size are
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reversed. In the x-axis we vary λ and each line in the plot corresponds to a different
training data set size.
4.6.4.1 AllWeak
We start by looking at the first row of Figure 4.5 which is the result of ‘AllWeak’ data
set. From Figure 4.5a we first notice that for small value of λ , AUC value increases
as training data size increases. However, for large value of λ , AUC value decreases
when training data size increases to around 100, which is the number of features. This
is because with more data and thus more information, the SafeRule is taking effect
with large value of λ and potentially informative predictors are being pruned. Since
SafeRule only applies to `1, the effect is only visible in Figure 4.5a. Figure 4.5c
indicates that for `1 regularizer, AUC value is sensitive to the value of λ . This can
also be explained by the effect of the SafeRule. For `2 regularizer, Figure 4.5b and
4.5d indicates AUC value increases in the number of training data and is stable in the
value of λ . This is because all the features are weakly correlated with the dependent
variable and thus all the predictors are supposed to be small. Thus a large value of
λ has no impact. Perhaps the most important conclusion we can draw from the first
row of Figure 4.5 is that `2 regularizer achieves better AUC value when the number
of training data size increases. Again, this is because for `1 regularizer, SafeRule is
taking effect and informative features are being pruned. This experiment validates the
third node in the ‘Decision Map’, where when all the features are weakly correlated
with the dependent variable, a practitioner should use `2 regularizer.
4.6.4.2 FewStrong
Now we look at the second row of Figure 4.5 which is the results of ‘Few Strong’
data set. For `1 regularizer, from Figure 4.5e and 4.5g we observe behavior as in the
’AllWeak’ data set. The difference is that in this case the AUC value is also sensitive to
the size of the training data. This is because only a few features are highly correlated
with the dependent variable, thus more data is needed to learn a model well. Figure 4.5f
and 4.5h convey similar information as in ‘AllWeak’ data set. Comparing `1 and `2,
one can observe that the `1 regularizer achieves better AUC value at some small values
of λ . However for small λ , the model is not likely to be sparse and thus defeating the
one of the strong reasons for using `1. For large values of λ sparsity is achieved but
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the AUC value of `1 regularizer goes down training data size increases. Thus, we can
conclude from this experiments that when the training number is large compared with
the number of features i.e. N P, a practitioner should use `2 regularizer.
4.6.4.3 SpamBase
The results on the ‘SpamBase’ data set are described in the third row of Figure 4.5 The
features of ‘SpamBase’ are frequency of key words and thus some words can be much
more informative than others. Thus this data set is similar to the ‘FewStrong’ synthetic
data set. When the training data is small , i.e. P≈ N, Figure 4.5i and 4.5j indicate that
`1 regularizer has better performance while for large number of training data sets, `2
regularizer has better performance.
4.6.4.4 WebSpam
Now we look at the fourth row of Figure 4.5 which is the results of ‘WebSpam’ data set.
Note that the features of this data set are derived features related to network properties
like in-degree, page rank and edge reciprocity. It is well known that features like page
rank can be used to distinguish between spam and non-spam web pages. Thus these are
strongly correlated features with the dependent variable. Now for large values of λ , the
`2 regularizer will pull the feature weights closer to zero thus reducing the AUC value
while in the case of `1, the SafeRule will not come into effect.
4.7 Summary
The main contribution of the chapter is to construct a decision map which compares
the performance of `1 and `2 regularizer based on four characteristics of data: stability,
robustness, correlation between independent and dependent variable, and the shape.
Future work will focus on a deeper mathematical analysis of the regularizer and the
evaluation of the decision map on other situations.
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Chapter 5
Latent Outlier Detection and the Low
Precision Problem
This chapter is based on the following publication:
Wang, Fei, Sanjay Chawla, and Didi Surian. Latent outlier detection and the low
precision problem. Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD Workshop on Outlier Detection
and Description. ACM, 2013.
5.1 Introduction
It is well known that new scientific discoveries or “paradigm shifts” are often triggered
by the need to explain outliers [47]. The availability of large and ever increasing data
sets, across a wide spectrum of domains, provides an opportunity to actively identify
outliers with the hope of making new discoveries.
The obvious dilemma in outlier detection is whether the discovered outliers are an
artifact of the measurement device or indicative of something more fundamental. Thus
the need is not only to design algorithms to identify complex outliers but also provide a
framework where they can be described and explained. Sometimes it is easy to explain
outliers. For example, we applied the recently introduced k-means-- algorithm [20] on
the 2012 season NBA player data set1. k-means-- extends the standard k-means algo-
rithm to simultaneously identify clusters and outliers. The result of the Top-5 outliers
are shown in Table 5.9 and matches with the top players in the NBA “All Star” team.
1www.basketball-reference.com
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An NBA star is an outlier and given the highly competitive nature of NBA, an outlier
is most likely a star. Or in other words there are no bad players in the NBA but some
players are very good! However, in many other applications it is not at all clear how to
proceed to explain outliers. This can be termed as the “Low Precision Problem (LPP)”
of outlier detection.
Table 5.1: Given the highly competitive nature of the NBA, not only are stars outliers,
but outliers are stars! All the top five outliers are well known leading players of NBA.
Outlier Rank Player Name All Star Team (Y/N)
1 Kevin Durant Y
2 Kobe Bryant Y
3 LeBron James Y
4 Kevin Love N
5 Russell Westbrook Y
Problem 1 The Low Precision Problem (LPP) in outlier detection is that
P(genuine outlier|predicted outlier)≈ low (5.1)
LPP occurs because it is hard to disambiguate genuine outliers from errors occurring
in the measurement device.
The main algorithm proposed in this chapter extends the work on k-means-- pro-
posed in et al. [20] which unifies clustering and outlier detection. Furthermore we have
taken inspiration from a body of work on multiple subspace outlier detection to distin-
guish between genuine and accidental outliers [59].
5.2 The multiple subspace view
A starting point towards addressing LPP and explaining and sifting genuine outliers
from measurement errors is to view data from multiple perspectives [59]. In the context
where data entities are described by a vector of features, examining an entity in all
possible feature subspaces can potentially lead to isolating genuine outliers. This is
especially true in high dimensional settings. For example assume that each entity is
described by a feature vector of size m. Furthermore, assume that the probability of
each feature being recorded incorrectly is p and is independent of other features. Then
5.3. HIGH-DIMENSIONAL ANOMALIES 59
if m is large, the probability that at least one feature value has been recorded incorrectly
is 1− (1− p)m and this can be close to 1 when m is large. Thus having at least one
feature value which is corrupted due to measurement error is high. However if we can
view the data in multiple subspaces then a genuine outliers will consistently stand out.
A limitation of the multiple subspace approach is that there are exponentially many
subspaces leading to intractable algorithms. However the problem can be ameliorated
if we notice that in real data sets, the intrinsic dimensionality (which is the minimum
number of variable need to represent the data) of the data is much lower than the ambient
dimensionality (which is the actual number of dimension we perceived of the data) as
we now explain.
5.3 High-Dimensional Anomalies
It is now part of the data mining folklore that in real data sets, the “degrees of freedom”
which actually generate the data is small, albeit unknown. This can be illustrated using
examples from computer vision. For example, consider a subset of the Yale Face data
shown in Figure 5.1. Each image is very high-dimensional (64× 64 = 4,096), how-
ever the set of images together live on a three dimensional manifold where the degree
of freedom are governed by the rotation of the camera and the lighting. The bottom
right hand image (transpose of the top left image) is an outlier as it lives outside the
manifold [25].
Thus given a high-dimensional space, if we can project data into a lower-dimension
space which preserves the intrinsic structure of the data, then not only can we iden-
tify outliers efficiently but potentially explain the discovered outliers. An example of
manifold-preserving projection are the family of random projections which preserve
pairwise distances with high probability [25]. However, while random projections can
lead to improvements in efficiency, by their very nature they make it nearly impossi-
ble to interpret the outliers. Thus we need a set of projections to which we can also
ascribe some meaning. We next describe matrix factorization methods which are pro-
jections of data into lower dimensional space where each dimension aggregates a group
of correlated features.
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Figure 5.1: An example to explain the difference between intrinsic and ambient dimen-
sion. Samples from the 698-image Yale face data. Each 64 x 64 is a point in a 4,096
dimensional space. However the set of images live in a three dimension set. The bottom
right image is added as the transpose of the top left image and is an outlier.
5.4 Matrix Factorization
As we have noted, the challenge in outlier detection is the difficulty to separate true
outliers from those data points that are caused because of measurement errors. We have
also noted that in high-dimensional space most of the features tend to be correlated.
Thus if a data point is a true outlier that fact should be visible in several features. Thus
if we take a subspace approach then a genuine outlier will show up as an outlier in more
subspaces than an accidental outlier. The challenge in pursuing a subspace approach is
that the space of subspaces is exponential in the number of features and thus intractable
to explore for most practical problems.
One way to address the intractability is to reduce the dimensionality of the origi-
nal space. This can be carried out using matrix factorization approaches. Factorization
is a principled approach of simultaneously aggregating correlated features into a re-
duced number of “meta-features” which in turn can be imbued with semantics related
to the application domain. While Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) and Princi-
pal Component Analysis (PCA) have been around for a long time, the recent surge in
new methods like Non-Negative Matrix Factorization (NMF) and Bayesian factoriza-
tion have enhanced the reach of these methods [70]. The key advantage of NMF, say
over SVD, is the enhanced interpretation that these methods afford. For example, if
X is non-negative document-word matrix or data from a micro-array experiment and
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X =UV is a non-negative factorization (i.e., both U and V are also non-negative) then
the factors can be ascribed a meaning as shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Non-Negative Factorization provides enhanced interpretation of the meta-
features. In text processing, the meta-features can be interpreted as topics, while in
micro-array analysis, the meta-features are group of correlated genes.
X U V
Document-Word Document-Topic Topic-Word
Exp-Gene (Exp,Functional Group) (Functional Group, Gene)
5.4.1 The impact of Projections
Outliers can potentially be impacted in different ways depending upon the nature of
outliers. For example, consider the projection shown in Figure 5.2. The projection
shown will have no impact on data point 1, will force data point 3 into a cluster and
data point 2 will continue to remain an outlier even though it is far away from the
projection plane. Now, which one of these points are genuine outliers is potentially
application dependent. However, if we take a subspace perspective, then data point 1
is more likely a genuine outlier. This is because it preserves the correlation between its
components but each component is moved far from the main cluster.
5.4.2 Sensitivity to Outliers
While techniques like NMF provide a promising way to address the combinatorial ex-
plosion problem associated with multiple subspace viewing, like SVD, they are highly
sensitive to outliers. Thus if our aim is to find outliers, then our method of discovering
outliers should not in turn be affected by them. For example, it is well known that both
mean and the variance-covariance matrix are extremely sensitive to the presence of even
one extreme value and their use for outlier detection will often mask the discovery of
genuine outliers. Thus we first have to modify NMF to make them more robust against
outliers. Thus we define the following problem:
Problem 2 [NMF(k,`)] Given a non-negative matrix X ∈ Rm×n+ , fixed integers k and
`, find matrices U ∈ Rm×k+ , V ∈ Rk×n+ and a subset L ⊂ N, |L| = `, which minimizes
‖X−`−UV−`‖F , where X−` is a submatrix consisting of all columns except those from
the set L.
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Figure 5.2: The figure shows the impact of projections of outliers in a lower dimensional
space. Data points 1 and 2 remain outliers after projection, while data point 3 is mixed
with normal after the projection [41].
To solve the NMF(k, `) problem we present the R-NMF algorithm shown in Algo-
rithm 3. The algorithm belong to the class of alternating minimization methods and
is very similar to the standard NMF algorithm except for a few caveats. We begin by
initializing U in Line 1. In Line 4, we solve for V which minimizes the Frobenius norm
of ‖X −U i−1V‖F . In Line 5, we compute the residual between X and the current esti-
mate of the product U i−1V . In Line 6, we rank the residuals based on the norm of their
column values, and L is the index vector of the ranking. We then generate new matrices
X−` and V−` by removing the first ` values of the set X and V in Line 7 and 8. In Line
9, we estimate U by minimizing the Frobenius norm of X−` and UV i−`. We iterate until
the convergence criterion is met.
The R-NMF algorithm is an analogous extension of the recently proposed k-means-
- algorithm [20]. We should note that another extension for NMF to find outliers
has been proposed by Xiong et al. [84] introduced the method of Direct Robust Matrix
Factorization (DMRF). The DMRF method first assumes the existence of a small outlier
set S and then infers the low-rank factorization UV by removing S from the data set.
It then updates S by using the inferred factorization. In the experiment section we will
compare R-NMF with DNMF.
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Algorithm 3 [R-NMF Algorithm]
Require: A matrix X of size m×n, m number of features, n number of samples
k the size of the latent space
Ensure: An m× k matrix U and k×n matrix V
R≈UV
1: U0← random m× k matrix
2: i← 1
3: while (no convergence achieved) do
4: V i = argminV ‖X−U i−1V‖F
5: R = X−U i−1V i \\R is a residual matrix
6: Let L = {1,2, . . . ,n} be a new ordering of the columns of R such
‖R(:,1)‖ ≥ ‖R(:,2)‖ . . .≥ ‖R(:,n)‖
7: X−`← X(:,L\L(1 : `))
8: V−`←V (:,L\L(1 : `))
9: U i = argminU ‖X−`−UV i−`‖
10: i← i+1
11: end while
The R-NMF algorithm forms the kernel of the subspace algorithm, SR-NMF shown
in Algorithm 4 which combines subspace enumeration with R-NMF. Note we only take
subspace of the “meta-features.” The intuition is that genuine outliers will emerge as
outliers in the latent subspaces.
Here we design algorithm that incorporate both the concept of multi subspace view
and matrix factorization. As we mentioned before the shortage in [59] is that due to the
high dimensionality nature in most of the data set, one simply can not brute force and
traversal each and every subspaces. We solve this problem by investigate the problem
in a latent space where data are confined in a much small dimensionality.
5.5 Experiments and Results
In this section we evalute both R-NMF,DRMF from [84] and SR-NMF on several data
sets. Our ultimate objective is to verify if SR-NMF can be used to address the LPP
problem. All our experiments were carried out on a PC with following configurations.
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2400 CPU @3.1GHz 4GB RAM running on 64-bit Microsoft
Windows 7 Enterprise Edition.
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Algorithm 4 [SR-NMF]
Require: A matrix X of size m×n, m number of features, n number of samples, k the
size of the latent space, ` number of outliers
Ensure: A vector R represent the ranking of anomalies with a score in descending
order
1: Using R−NMF algorithm we get U and V such that X ≈UV
(U,V ) = R−NMF(k, `)
2: j← 0;RANKS← empty matrix;
3: STEP1 generate ranks for each subspace
4: for i = 1→ k do
5: generate all set of combinations AS from (k choose i)
6: for each S ∈AS do
7: Residual = X−U(:,S)V (S, :)
8: RNorm = columnNorm(Residual)
9: [−,RANK] = sort(RNorm, ‘descend’)
10: RANKS = [RANKS;RANK]
11: j++
12: end for
13: end for
14: STEP2 merge ranks into one rank
15: R← vector of size n;
16: for i = 1→ j do
17: for p = 1→ n do
18: R(RANKS(i, p)) = R(RANKS(i, p))+ i
19: end for
20: end for
21: sort R in descending order
[−,R] = sort(R, ‘descend’) (Note: Matlab Notation)
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5.5.1 Data Sets
We used three data sets from different application domains which we now describe.
NBA 2012
The NBA 2012 data set consists of 483 players and 20 features. The features are values
related to metrics used to evaluate performances of the players in a season. For example,
features like 3PAr (3 point Attempt Rate), TOV (Turnover Percentage) and MP(Minutes
Played) etc.
Abstract
The Abstract data set is a collection of abstracts from Physics and Science papers. The
data is formatted into document-words matrix with 1000 samples from each group and
3894 features which are the most frequent words. In the experiments we compose two
types of data sets from this data set. One is composed of 1000 Physics and 100 Science
abstracts and we label Physics abstract as anomalies. The other one is 100 Physics and
1000 Science abstracts.
Spambase
‘Spambase’ is a spam email data set [29] consisting of 4,601 emails out of which 1,813
(39%) are spam. The spam e-mails came from their postmaster and individuals who had
filed spam and non-spam e-mails from work and personal e-mails. Most of the features
(48 out of 57) are frequency of key words.
Research Abstracts
We took around one thousand computer science paper titles from DBLP and also a
thousand physics research paper abstracts. We created two data sets. In the first we
kept the thousand CS titles and merged them with one hundred physics abstracts. For
the second data set, we kept the thousand physics abstracts and merged them with a
random subset of one hundred computer science titles. We call the former CSet and the
latter PSet.
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5.5.2 Results
We report results on robustness, convergence, runtime and accuracy on the three afore-
mentioned data sets.
Results:Robustness of R-NMF
Here we report on results about the sensitivity of the R-NMF against the classical NMF
algorithm, which we denote as O-NMF. We applied both R-NMF and O-NMF algorithm
on the NBA 2012 data set but modified one entry in the matrix as a multiple of the mean
value. This is shown on the x-axis of Figure 5.3. For each different value on the x-axis
we computed the U matrix and computed the difference in the norm of the new U matrix
and the original U matrix. The U matrix is the base matrix and stores the meta-features
in terms of the original features.
Figure 5.3 shows that R-NMF is more robust against perturbations while the U
matrix using O-NMF increases without bound. This clearly demonstrates that the tradi-
tional NMF algorithm should not be used for any serious applications as it is extremely
sensitive to data perturbations.
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Figure 5.3: R-NMF is substantially more robust against the presence of outliers in the
data compared to standard O-NMF.
Results:Convergence Analysis
Here we investigate the convergence properties of the R-NMF algorithms. From Algo-
rithm 3 we know that for each iteration R-NMF will reconstruct U with a given number
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of outliers excluded. However, each iteration the algorithm may exclude different data
points as outliers, this could potentially make the algorithm unstable. Thus, it is neces-
sary to study whether this new algorithm will converge properly.
We conduct the experiments as follows. We use the Spambase data set, and set the
number of outliers for R-NMF as the number of spam emails. We vary k and present
the results for k=9,12,15, and 18.
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Figure 5.4: R-NMF converges with all given settings of k. As the dimension of the
subspace (k) increases, residual of R-NMF algorithm goes down.
As can be seen from Figure 5.4, the first thing one can notice is that with bigger k,
the residual of the algorithm goes down. This is because with bigger k, the decomposed
matrices UV can better reconstruct the original X . Most importantly, the algorithm
converge at all given settings of k within 20 repetitions.
Results:Runtime
We present the run time results of R-NMF algorithm for the Spambase data sets in Fig-
ure 5.5 respectively. As expected, we observe that the run time of R-NMF decreases as
the number of outliers is increased. This trend follows the intuition of R-NMF algorithm
that the construction of base matrix U is based on the data X without the anomalous
points (Algorithm 3 line 5-8).
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Figure 5.5: Average Run time R-NMF on Spambase data set: (Left) k = 1, (Middle)
k = 2, (Right) k = 3. As the number of outliers increases, the run time for R-NMF
decreases. The values here are the average values for all iterations.
Results:Precision and Recall
We compute precision and recall on the Spambase, PSet and the CSet data sets. The
outliers are considered as positives. The experiments are conducted as follows. We
vary the two variables: k and `, We compared the two proposed algorithms: R-NMF
and SR-NMF against the Direct Robust Matrix Factorization (DMRF) approach pro-
posed by [84]. The results for different values of k and different sizes of the outliers
specified are show from Table 3-7. At the moment it is hard to draw conclusions from
the results. Futher work is required to analyse the results and determine the root cause
of the outliers.
The experiments are conducted as follows. We vary two variables: k and `, and
take precision and recall as the metrics. For this data set, we define the precision as
the number of true positive divided by the number of predicted positive (Equation 5.2),
while the recall is defined as the number of true positive divided by the number of
positive (Equation 5.3). Note that here we refer the predicted positive as the number of
outliers detected by our algorithms, positive as the above-mentioned records that have
complications, and true positive as the number of records detected by our algorithms
which are part of records that have complications. Both R-NMF, SR-NMF and DRMF
are applied with the same settings. Since the data set is already selected with fine
granularity, thus the rank of the original matrix is low, we set small values for k, from 1
to 3 precisely, while ` is varied from 200 to 2,000.
Precision =
number of true positive
number of predicted positive
(5.2)
Recall =
number of true positive
number of positive
(5.3)
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Spambase data set.
‘Spambase’ is a spam email data set [29] with a total number of 4,601 email, out of
which 1,813 (39%) are spam emails. The spam e-mails came from their postmaster and
individuals who had filed spam and non-spam e-mails from work and personal e-mails.
Most of the features (48 out of 57) are frequency of key words.
For the Spambase data set, we perform the same steps as previously. In this ex-
periment, we vary the variables k from 6, 9 and 12, while ` is varied from 100 to 500.
We use the same equations (Equation 5.2 and 5.3) to compute the precision and recall,
however, in this case the we consider the spam emails as the positive data. We present
the results for precision and recall on Spambase data set in Table 5.3 and 5.4 respec-
tively. The tables show that in some configurations, R-NMF gives competitive results,
however, in general SR-NMF outperforms RNMF and DRMF in both precision and
recall.
Table 5.3: Precision on Spambase: DRMF, SR-NMF and R-NMF. Best values are high-
lighted.
k
Portion of data as outliers
7% 10% 13%
DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF
6 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.32 0.26 0.29 0.37 0.32 0.36
9 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.35
12 0.25 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.36
Table 5.4: Recall on Spambase: DRMF, SR-NMF and R-NMF. Best values are high-
lighted.
k
Portion of data as outliers
7% 10% 13%
DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF
6 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.12
9 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.12
12 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.12
Table 5.5: Precision on Abstract: DRMF, SR-NMF and R-NMF. PhysicsAnomaly.
k
Portion of data as outliers
35% 40% 45%
DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF
6 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.11
9 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.11
12 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.11
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Table 5.6: Recall on Abstract: DRMF, SR-NMF and R-NMF. PhysicsAnomaly.
k
Portion of data as outliers
35% 40% 45%
DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF
6 0.39 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.51 0.54 0.47 0.56 0.55
9 0.36 0.47 0.52 0.45 0.52 0.54 0.46 0.56 0.56
12 0.39 0.48 0.47 0.40 0.53 0.55 0.45 0.56 0.52
Table 5.7: Recision on Abstract: DRMF, SR-NMF and R-NMF. ScienceAnomaly.
k
Portion of data as outliers
35% 40% 45%
DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF
6 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14
9 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15
12 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15
Table 5.8: Recall on Abstract: DRMF, SR-NMF and R-NMF. ScienceAnomaly.
k
Portion of data as outliers
35% 40% 45%
DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF DRMF SR-NMF R-NMF
6 0.49 0.56 0.58 0.72 0.66 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.70
9 0.60 0.60 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.73 0.72
12 0.65 0.60 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.73
Abstract data set.
Here we compare the three algorithms on two sets of data sets as we described in the
Data Sets section. We first generate a data set composed of 1000 Sciences sample and
100 Physics samples. We label the Physics samples as anomalies and denote this data
set as PhysicsAnomaly. Then similarly we generate another data set composed of 1000
Physics samples and 100 Science samples. We label the Science samples as anomalies
and denote this data set as ScienceAnomaly.
The settings are as follows. For each experiment, we set k as 6,9 and 12. l is set as
35%, 40% and 45% of the full sample space. Results are presented in Table 5.5,5.6 ,
5.7 and 5.8
We can observe that overall, R-NMF has the best performance in both precision and
recall. We can also learn from this experiment that simply identifying minorities as
anomalies can give reasonable result.
Basketball data set.
Here we compare the NMF-Subspace algorithm an k-means--on the Basketball data
set. k is set as 10 for both the two aoglrithms. In terms of appearance, there is only
one difference in the first five anomalies compared with k-means--algorithm. ’Dwight
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Howard’ instead of ‘Russell Westbrook’ indentified as anomaly. This is a better result
since ’Dwight Howard’ is a more famous player.
Table 5.9: Given the highly competitive nature of the NBA, not only are stars outliers,
but outliers are stars! All the top five outliers are well known leading players of NBA.
Outlier Rank Player Name All Star Team (Y/N)
1 Kevin Durant Y
2 Dwight Howard Y
3 Kevin Love N
4 LeBron James Y
5 Kobe Bryant Y
5.6 Summary
Outlier Detection is a core task in data mining. In fact as the size and complexity of
data sets increases the need to identify meaningful and genuine outliers will only grow.
Almost all major applications ranging from health analytic to network data manage-
ment to bio-informatics require analytical tools which can identify and explain genuine
outliers.
The core challenge in outlier detection is to distinguish between genuine and noise
outliers. The former are indicative of a new, previously unknown process while the
latter is often a result of error in the measurement device. The difficulty to distinguish
between genuine and noise outliers leads to the Low Precision Problem (LPP). Our
claim is that LPP is the fundamental problem in outlier detection and algorithmic ap-
proaches to solve LPP are urgently needed.
One approach to distinguish between genuine and noise outliers is to take a multiple
subspace viewpoint. A genuine outlier will stand out in multiple subspaces while a
noise outlier will be separated from the core data in much fewer subspaces. However
the problem in subspace exploration is that current methods are unlikely to scale to high
dimensions.
Matrix factorization methods provide a balanced compromise between full subspace
exploration in the feature space versus exploration in the meta-feature or latent space.
The advantage of working in the latent space is that many of the features are aggregated
into a correlated meta-feature. Often these features in the latent space can be imbued
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with a semantic meaning relevant to the problem domain. For example, in the case of
text mining, the features correspond to words while meta-features correspond to topics.
The challenge with matrix factorization methods is that they are highly sensitive
to outliers. This can be a serious problem whenever there is a mismatch between the
data and the proposed model. One way to ameliorate the problem is to use an alternate
minimization approach to estimate both the matrix decomposition and the outlier set.
This is the basis of the NMF(k,`) problem and the R-NMF algorithm. Preliminary
results show that R-NMF is substantially more robust compared to NMF in the presence
of data noise. This opens up a promising avenue for further exploration and address the
LPP.
Chapter 6
Network Analysis on Healthcare
This chapter is based on the following publication:
Wang, Fei, Uma Srinivasan, Shahadat Uddin, and Sanjay Chawla. Application of
Network Analysis on Healthcare. Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining
(ASONAM), 2014 IEEE/ACM International Conference on. IEEE, 2014.
6.1 Introduction
Previous work on health insurance analytics using data mining and predictive mod-
elling [73] gives a good understanding of the semantics and the data available in a
private health insurance (PHI) claim, and the claiming patterns of hospitals and medical
providers. Within the context of Australian PHI there are two types of claims. A med-
ical claim is sent by a doctor - also referred to as a provider - who performs a service
to treat a patient who is a member of a particular private health insurer. The medical
claim has information about the provider, the member, the hospital where the patient
was treated, the details of the treatment and the cost of the services provided. A hos-
pital claim is sent by a hospital’s billing department and includes details of treatment,
theatre charges, accommodation charges, prosthetics charges and charges for other ser-
vices provided. Leveraging on that understanding, we have started using social network
analysis techniques to model provider relationships, and analyse the impact of provider
community structures on healthcare costs and quality of care.
We present two types of networks to explore collaboration among medical providers:
(i) collaboration networks (CN) designed to capture the collaboration among surgeons,
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anaesthetists and assistant surgeons (ii) surgeon centric collaboration networks (SCCN)
which explore an individual surgeon’s connections.
In terms of the network representations used in this chapter, a node in the network
represents a (medical) provider such as surgeon, anaesthetist, assistant surgeon; the
node size indicates the total amount charged by that provider; the thickness of the edge
(or tie strength) connecting two nodes represents the number of common hospital ad-
missions between the two providers. In this chapter, an admission refers to a single
episode of admitted patient care. The time interval between the date of admission and
the date of discharge represents the length of stay for that admission.
In addition to size of nodes and tie strength, other network measures - closeness
centrality and betweenness centrality that are related to the position of the node in the
network, and centralization measures that indicate how central its most central node is
in relation to how central other nodes are, can provide interesting insights about the
influence of the node in the overall communication control capacity and the network.
For example, the larger nodes with a more influential position in the network have the
capacity to provide additional meaning within the context of the graph.
In the context of healthcare, the questions we are trying to answer are:
• Is there a team structure that emerges as providers work together on a number of
shared admissions?
• What is the impact of an individual surgeon’s network on cost and quality of care
of the surgeries performed?
• What types network structures have positive or negative impact on cost and qual-
ity of care?
Our experiments indicate that betweenness centralisation in the SCCN network is
the variable that has significant positive influence on Length of Stay (LoS), Complica-
tion rate and Medical cost. This gives an indication that nodes with high betweenness
centrality are likely to be in more demand.
Our theoretical analysis combined with empirical investigation over a large data set
also suggest that surgeons who collaborate with more number of teams appear to have
a lower average LoS.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 presents a brief review
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of collaboration models explored in the context of healthcare domain. Section 6.3 de-
scribes our research methodology to explore collaborations among providers using PHI
claims data. Section 6.4 presents an analysis of our findings. And finally Section 6.5
presents some conclusions and future work.
6.2 Collaboration in health care
Our study of surgeon collaboration presented in this chapter offers a unique perspective
as it combines theoretical analysis with empirical investigations of a PHI large data set.
The design of the collaboration model presented in this chapter is influenced by the
requirements of domain experts who wish to understand the nature of team structures
that have an impact on cost as well as quality of care provided to patients for specific
types of treatments. In order to keep it simple, in this chapter, we have used only
knee procedures as the exemplar treatment group. We have designed similar models
for other orthopaedic procedures as well other treatment groups such as cardiology and
cardio-thoracic procedures. More details of the application scenario is explained in the
following section.
The hospital and medical claims processed by an insurer contain data that specify
the type of service provided during an admission, the length of stay for that admission,
and the cost of that service. The service is specified as a Medicare Benefit Schedule
(MBS) code [21], as stipulated by the Australian Government. The hospitals also send
additional data related to an admission, once the patient is discharged. For any given
hospital admission, we deal with three sets of data:
1. Medical claims - these show the provider-ID i.e. who performed a service, and the
service is indicated by the MBS code for the specific type of treatment performed
while the patient was in hospital;
2. Hospital claims - these are sent by the billing department of the hospital, and
include MBS codes, accommodation cost, prosthetic costs, laboratory and radi-
ology costs; and
3. Hospital discharge data that consolidates the patient’s clinical care during that
particular admission, and includes details such as length of stay, whether this was
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an unplanned readmission, and additional diagnosis codes that indicate compli-
cations or infections that occurred during that admission. Therefore the discharge
data provides us with valuable information pertaining to quality of care.
We use data from all three sources to design our network models. The network graph
presented in this chapter represents the collaboration among three specific types of med-
ical providers; the surgeons, the anaesthetists and assistant surgeons, as they perform
knee-related surgical procedures.
6.3 Surgeon Collaboration network Design
In this section, we first report on the graphical models designed to capture the col-
laboration among medical providers. In addition we also explore a Surgeon-Centric
Collaboration Network (SCCN) which explores an individual surgeon’s connections.
Finally, we provide network concepts that are related to our work.
6.3.1 Design of Collaboration Network (CN)
The objective of our initial design is to investigate the quality of care provided by a spe-
cific provider or a group of providers who collaborate while performing knee surgeries.
The PHI domain experts are interested in understanding the impact of collaboration
among the three types of providers: surgeons, anaesthetists, assistant surgeons (also
refer to assistants in the rest of the chapter). This leads us to design a tripartite graph in
which the nodes correspond to the three types of providers.
The data we have for any private health insurer include the three types of data sets
specified in Section 6.2. Therefore, the information represented in the three sets of data
offers us content-rich health information about each admission episode. The admissions
are categorized by the treatment codes as specified in the MBS coding taxonomy. For
example, knee surgeries are coded in the following hierarchy: ‘Therapeutic→ Surgical
Operation→ Orthopaedic→ Knee’. The nodes represent the providers, and the edges
as the number of common admissions shared by the two providers. We then associate
the node size with the total medical charges of the corresponding provider. The three
different types of providers are shown in three distinct colors: red for surgeons, blue for
anaesthetists and light blue for assistants. A thicker edge indicates a higher number of
shared admissions. Figure 6.1 shows an example of a collaboration graph.
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Just by glancing at the graph, one can immediately identify the ’big’ providers, i.e.
providers with high medical charges, as well as highly connected providers. We can also
see isolated cluster of providers. Often such isolated clusters indicate providers working
in a specific geographic region. This network graph offers a powerful visualization to
study collaboration among providers.
The primary focus of our investigation is to study the impact of the collaboration
network structure on quality of care. To do this we consider all possible network fea-
tures.
Figure 6.1: The tripartite graph represent the collaboration between three types of
providers: surgeons (red), anaesthetists (blue) and assistants (light blue). The edge
thickness is modeled as the number of collaborating claims by two types of providers.
The size of the node is modeled as the medical charge of the provider.
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6.3.2 Design of Surgeon Centric Collaboration Network (SCCN)
Since the focus is on surgeons, we investigate a specific surgeon node in the CN and
build a lower level Surgeon-Centric Collaboration Network (SCCN). The SCCN is a
network of a specific surgeon. It shows how a specific surgeon collaborates with the
assistants and anaesthetists, and the hospital(s) in which they work together while per-
forming knee surgeries. The individual surgeon node is not shown in the SCCN as all
admissions (which are modeled as the edges) relate to a particular surgeon. Therefore,
we only model two types of edges, one is the edge between assistants and hospitals,
the other is between anesthetists and hospitals. Since it’s a surgeon centric network, we
have not shown the links between assistants and anesthetists. However such links are
shown in the CN graph. The SCCN network also shows the hospitals where the surgeon
performs knee surgeries. The hospital node is represented symbolically in the form of
a building. The size of the building indicates the total medical cost. Edge thickness
is modeled as the number of admissions of the specific surgeon with an anaesthetic or
assistant in that hospital. Two SCCN graphs are shown in Figure 6.2. The graph on the
left shows a surgeon who only works in one hospital and collaborates with nine anaes-
thetists or assistants. The graph on the right shows a surgeon who works in two hospitals
and collaborates with anaesthetists or assistants who also work in those hospitals.
Figure 6.2: Two SCCN graphs with hospital represented by a building icon.
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6.4 Data analysis
This section describes the experimental analysis staring with the data preparation, se-
lection of network variables , selection of quality of care parameters, the regression
model and finally an empirical investigation to compare the theoretical results within
the context of the large PHI data corpus.
6.4.1 Data preparation
6.4.1.1 Selection of admission-related variables
In terms of non-network variables, we have identified four admission related features,
which are shown in the top section of Table 6.1. The admission data shows all the med-
ical providers who are involved in treating a patient during that admission. We consider
four types of providers that includes: anaesthetists, assistants, pathologists and imaging
providers. Typically a surgery has one principal surgeon and assistant and anaesthetist
who work with the surgeon during the surgery. Specifically, we consider the number
of distinct providers a surgeon collaborates with while performing a knee surgery. For
the data analysis, we consider the percentage of distinct providers who collaborate with
the surgeon rather than the absolute number of providers. The percentage is calculated
with the denominator as the sum of distinct number of the four types of providers col-
laborating with the surgeon in knee procedure.
6.4.1.2 Selection of network variables
For network features, we first consider CN graph as depicted in Figure 6.1. We have
three types of nodes in the graph, out of which, around 500 nodes are ‘surgeon’ nodes.
Amongst several possible network variables, we have specifically selected five network
features as shown in Table 6.1. We have chosen these variables as they have the potential
to offer insights into the collaboration patterns among providers.
Clustering-coefficient: The local clustering coefficient of a vertex (node) in a graph
quantifies how close its neighbors are to being a clique (complete graph). In our context,
this represents the strength of the surgeon’s network.
Number of triangles: The global clustering coefficient is based on triplets of nodes.
A triplet consists of three nodes that are connected by either two (open triplet) or three
(closed triplet) undirected ties. A triangle consists of three closed triplets, one centred
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Figure 6.3: Surgeon node with Number of triangle as 3
on each of the nodes. In our context, a triangle shows the three types of providers i.e.
surgeons, anaesthetists and assistants working together while performing knee surg-
eries. For example, in Figure 6.3, we depict a surgeon node with its surrounding assis-
tants and anaesthetists. This is a small subset extracted from the CN graph shown in
Figure 6.1. The surgeon node, which is represented as the red colour, has three triangles
connected to it. This indicates that the surgeon performs knee surgeries frequently with
three pairs of assistants and anaesthetists. . The features from the CN graph are all
node-level features.
Next we consider network-level features. For each surgeon, we have one SCCN
graph. We will consider the four network measures for the SCCN graph which are
shown in the bottom section of Table 6.1.
6.4.1.3 Selection of Quality of Care parameters
As for the quality of care, we have chosen three parameters:
LoS - the average length of stay for all admissions of the surgeon. This information
is available in hospital discharge data as explained in Section 6.2.
Medical cost - the average medical charge for all the knee related admissions teated
by the surgeon.
Complication rate - calculated as the percentage of admissions with complications
out of all the admissions of a surgeon.
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Table 6.1: The table shows all the features we have extracted from the data and the
network.
Non-network features
1 %. of distinct anaesthetists
2 %. of distinct assistants
3 %. of distinct pathologists
4 %. of distinct imaging providers
Network features of CN
1 Clustering coefficient
2 Number of triangles
3 Degree centrality
4 Closeness centrality
5 Betweenness centrality
Network features of SCCN
1 Degree centralisation
2 Closeness centralisation
3 Betweenness centralisation
4 Density
6.4.1.4 Data cleansing and transformation
Our data set for knee surgeries includes a total of 59,256 admissions performed by 870
surgeons. However, in order to make robust conclusions, we only considered surgeons
who had more than ten claims. We further looked at the distribution of the surgeons
according to each variable shown in Table 6.1 and removed surgeons who appeared as
outliers. Our analysis was carried out on a set of 559 surgeons. For all the variables in
Table 6.1, we applied z-score standardization. Thus each variable had a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one. In the simple regression analysis, that we will report
on, this allow us to interpret the constant and the “slope” term appropriately.
6.4.2 Simple linear regression
The quality of care parameters introduced in Section 6.4.1.3 are the dependent variables
in all the regression experiments. Since the independent variables are semantically
distinct in the healthcare domain, they have been dealt with independently. Hence an
individual linear model has been constructed for each variable. Although most of the
linear models have a low R2 value, our focus are the β values, which are significant.
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Table 6.2: Table explores the impact of all non-network attributes on quality of cares
(i.e. LoS, Medical cost)
Model Dependent Variable Independent Variable R2 value β Constant Sig.
1
LoS
%. of distinct anaesthetists 0.098 -0.438 3.506 0
2 %. of distinct assistants 0.023 -0.214 3.506 0
3 %. of distinct pathologists 0.003 0.074 3.506 0.211
4 %. of distinct imaging providers 0.179 0.592 3.506 0
5
Medical cost
%. of distinct anaesthetists 0.042 -58.127 1016.063 0
6 %. of distinct assistants 0.011 -29.481 1016.063 0.015
7 %. of distinct pathologists 0.002 14.200 1016.063 0.240
8 %. of distinct imaging providers 0.074 77.484 1016.063 0
Table 6.3: The table explores the impact of the network structure around a specialist
(based on SCCN) on quality of cares (i.e. LoS, Complication rate and Medical cost).
Model Dependent Variable Independent Variable R2 value β Constant Sig.
1
LoS
Degree centralization 0.014 0.164 3.506 0.005
2 Closeness centralization 0.023 0.212 3.506 0
3 Betweenness centralization 0.033 0.253 3.506 0
4 Density 0 0.024 3.506 0.681
5
Complication rate
Degree centralization 0.002 0.002 0.047 0.343
6 Closeness centralization 0.001 0.001 0.047 0.496
7 Betweenness centralization 0.014 0.006 0.047 0.005
8 Density 0.001 -0.001 0.047 0.494
9
Medical cost
Degree centralization 0 -1.684 1016.063 0.889
10 Closeness centralization 0.013 32.698 1016.063 0.007
11 Betweenness centralization 0.011 29.638 1016.063 0.014
12 Density 0.009 -27.014 1016.063 0.025
Table 6.4: The table shows the impact of network position of individual specialist in the
complete network (CN) on quality of cares (i.e. LoS, Complication rate).
Model Dependent Variable Independent Variable R2 value β Constant Sig.
1
LoS
Clustering coefficient 0.001 0.052 3.506 0.384
2 Number of triangles 0.005 -0.101 3.506 0.089
3 Degree centrality 0.003 -0.080 3.506 0.179
4 Closeness centrality 0.004 -0.085 3.506 0.149
5 Betweeness centrality 0 -0.016 3.506 0.788
6
Complication rate
Clustering coefficient 0.002 -0.002 0.047 0.277
7 Number of triangles 0.007 -0.004 0.047 0.048
8 Degree centrality 0.002 -0.002 0.047 0.298
9 Closeness centrality 0.002 0.002 0.047 0.350
10 Betweeness centrality 0 0.001 0.047 0.712
6.4.2.1 Non network features
Table 6.2 explores the impact of all admission-related features on the dependent vari-
ables (i.e. LoS, and Medical cost). We can see that a higher percentage of anaesthetist
and assistant indicates a lower LoS and Medical cost, while a higher percentage of
pathologists and imaging providers indicates a higher LoS and Medical cost. This is
intuitive since admissions with more imaging may be more severe situations and thus
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incur longer LoS and higher Medical cost.
6.4.2.2 Network features of SCCN
In Table 6.3, we observe that betweenness centralisation is the only variable that has
significant positive influence on LoS, Complication rate and Medical cost. This can be
interpreted as follows: From the perspective of a SCCN structure, a high betweenness
centralisation indicates that the structure of the corresponding SCCN follows a star-like
or centralized structure since betweenness centralisation reaches its highest value of 1
for a star network. A star-like or centralized network has few actors with higher be-
tweenness centrality values and the rest actors have very low betweenness centrality
values. In this type of network, only a small number of actors play major collabo-
ration and communication role (Wasserman and Faust 2003). That indicates there is
a presence of “network hubs” in this type of network. On the other side, if network
actors have almost equal level of network connectivity (as like a line graph) then be-
tweenness centralisation will be small and in such networks there does not present any
“network hub”. Therefore, SCCN, where participating actors have almost equal level
of network connectivity, will produce lower LoS, Complication rate and Medical cost.
In the context of health care domain, this offers an interesting insight. In their corre-
sponding hospitals, healthcare managers or administrators could encourage a practice
culture where each member will have equal level of network connectivity.
6.4.2.3 Network features of CN
Table 6.4 explores the impact of the network position of the individual specialist in the
complete network (CN) on independent variables (i.e. LoS, Complication rate). We
can observe that in the case of both LoS and Complication rate, the variable ‘Number
of triangles’ has a negative correlation. That is, when a surgeon works with a large
number of distinct groups, LoS and Complication rate are lower.
Intuitively, we have two assumptions with respect to the variable ‘Number of trian-
gles’: (i) Surgeons who work with large number of distinct assistants or anaesthetists
could be involved in more complicated surgeries and thus resulting longer Los and
higher complication rate. (ii) Surgeons who consistently work with only a few distinct
assistants or anaesthetists have a lower number of triangles. For these cases, our anal-
ysis shows a higher LoS. Our conjecture is that this limits external influence of other
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providers on the surgeon. The converse case where the number of triangles is higher
clearly shows lower LoS. Thus, to figure out which assumption is true we investigated
the different categories of knee surgeries and their impact on LoS in Section 6.4.3.
6.4.3 Treatment analysis
Table 6.5 shows the distribution of the different types of knee surgeries performed in
the data set used for analysis in this chapter. The data set used includes about 59,256
knee surgeries performed by 559 surgeons over a period of 2 years. As per the MBS
descriptions, there are four broad categories of knee surgeries with varying degrees of
complexity. Accordingly, the average length of stay for each category of knee surgery
varies. Column 3 of the table also shows the distribution of the four categories of knee
surgery. We conducted an empirical investigation to analyze the performance of teams
Table 6.5: Average LoS and percentage of admissions of the four knee categories.
Treatment type Average LoS Admissions %
Knee arthroscopy 1.24 58
Knee Revision 4.40 1
Knee Reconstruction 2.15 9
Knee Replacement 7.66 28
of surgeons indicated by the No, of triangles as shown in Table 6.4. Table 6.6 shows
two groups of providers: Group A and group B. Group A represents the 200 surgeons
having the least Number of triangles, and group B represent 200 surgeons with largest
Number of triangles. The purpose of this analysis is to compare the Average LoS for
each category of knee surgery for the two groups of providers.
Table 6.6: We can observe that, in terms of all the four treatment types, group B con-
sistently has a lower Average LoS compared to group A and also the whole data set as
shown in Table 6.5.
Treatment type Average LoS Admissions %
Group A B A B
Knee arthroscopy 1.31 1.21 58 57
Knee Revision 7.69 4.01 1 1
Knee Reconstruction 2.38 2.07 7 10
Knee Replacement 7.67 7.61 31 28
6.5. SUMMARY 85
Next we compare the Average LoS for each category of knee surgery for the two
groups in Table 6.6 with the Average LoS of the complete data set summarised in Table
6.5. We can observe that in all four categories of knee surgeries, group B consistently
has a lower Average LoS compared to group A, as well as the whole data set shown in
Table 6.5. The empirical investigation implies that surgeons who work with a higher
number of teams appear to have a lower length of stay. One could intuit that there is
social learning that comes into play. However, further investigation is required to con-
firm the intuitive analysis. Since the category distribution for group A and B are almost
identical. This makes assumption (i) in Section 6.4.2.3 invalid. Thus assumption (ii):
Lower Number of triangles limits external influence of other providers on the surgeon,
is a possible explanation.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter we have investigated the impact of network structure on the performance
of surgeon teams with respect to efficiency metrics including Medical costs, Length of
Stay (LoS) and Complication rate. Our data set was obtained from Australian PHI data
and consists of both medical and hospital claims. To reduce the impact of confounding
variables, we focused our analysis on “knee surgeries.” Our results provide a strong
indication that network features like degree, betweenness and closeness centralization
and number of triangles have a statistically significant impact on efficiency metrics. In
particular, for surgeon centric networks, betweenness centralization is significant for all
three metrics: Length of Stay, Complication rate and Medical cost. This observation can
potentially be used by health care providers to reorganize surgical teams and improve
the overall efficiency of health care delivery.
Chapter 7
Social Learning on Surgeons’
Behaviour
7.1 Introduction
In order to understand the impact of social learning on the behavior of members in
a medical team, we focus on orthopedic surgeons performing knee surgeries. Knee
surgeries are of particular interest because there is a specific procedure, called knee
arthroscopy, that is now considered to provide minimal health advantages, which begs
the question of why its use has not been discontinued [58]. Within this context we are
interested in the temporal patterns of two sets of variables: the use of specific types of
surgeries and the use of specific prosthetic devices, as to specific behavior indicators.
In this chapter we adapt a logistic regression model for the prediction of changes in
behavioral patterns of surgeons to incorporate dynamic social network structures. The
social network structures and behavioral patterns are extracted from health insurance
patient-level data that contains information about the typs of surgery performed, the
type of prosthetic devices used and the medical personnel involved in the surgery. Due
to the granularity and uniqueness of the data, we have the resources to construct three
social networks that describe connections among surgeones arising from: (i) practicing
at the same hospitals (ii) sharing the same assistants (iii) sharing the same anaesthetists.
Our primary objective is to enable private and public healthcare organizations to
better understand how behavioral trends may influence the delivery of healthcare ser-
vices. These organizations can use this valuable information for planning preventive
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health management strategies to improve the effectiveness of care and patient health
outcomes.
Key contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We incorporate network structures into logistic regression prediction for our pro-
posed approaches, Social Relationship Model (SRM) and its variant model Posi-
tive SRM (P-SRM).
• We conducted experiments to validate and evaluate the models on artificial data
and a real data set obtained from the health insurance industry.
• We verify that the social network connections have influence on the surgeons’
behaviors, where the behavior is the change in the workload distribution of knee
surgeries and change in the use of certain prosthetic devices used in knee surg-
eries.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: In Section 7.2 we describe related work
and some concepts in social learning theory. Then we formally define the general prob-
lem of dynamic node behaviours in Section 7.3. Sections 7.4 describe the mathematical
formulation which incorporate network structures into logistic regression prediction and
introduce our proposed models, SRM and P-SRM respectively. The subsequent sec-
tions, contain a discussion of the results from artificial experiments and our application
to hospital data as well as a summary of our contributions.
7.2 Background and Related Work
In this work the actors of interest are surgeons. We assume that surgeons form a social
network and communicate their experiences with their other network members. This
exchange of information can alter professional attitudes of surgeons, resulting in be-
havioral changes such as the adoption of a medical intervention (e.g. new equipment,
surgeries or medication). In this setting, knowledge is strongly tied to medical prac-
tices, and learning occurs when a group of surgeons collaborate in order to achieve a
common goal, that is to improve patients’ well being [62, 26, 66].
In the context of surgeons, we concentrate on how surgeons are influenced by the
attitudes and behaviors of other colleagues as well as their hospital environment. The
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influence of a surgeon is related to their knowledge, where an individual’s level of ex-
perience within a group defines whether they are a sender or receiver of information
[50]. Thus a knowledge-rich surgeon potentially has a greater influence on the profes-
sional practices of their fellow surgeons. This becomes an imitative behavior for a less
experienced surgeon where they adjust their behaviors accordingly [55].
Similar problems relating to the influence of peers on their behaviors have been
addressed by Wei et al. [64], who developed a computational model to predict the
adoption of smart phone apps by analysing social network connections among the users.
Experimentally the model showed superior results than generic models, although this
outcome may not necessarily hold in the context of surgeon analysis.
Fei et al. [83] also investigated the potential impact of network relationships on
the quality of care provided by surgeons. The main result showed that patterns in po-
tential network connections can influence quality of healthcare services. This research
relied on finding correlations between network features and thus developing metrics for
quality of care.
7.3 Problem Definition
We consider a network with N nodes, corresponding to N “actors”, where the network
relationship among nodes is encoded in several adjacency matrices A= {A1,A2, . . . ,AQ}
with Aq ∈ RN×N . There are C binary labels associated with each node, describing
the behavioral status of the node. This is captured by the matrix Y ∈ RN×C where
the nth row (nodes) and cth column (behaviors) can be denoted as yn,c ∈ {−1,1} or
yn,c ∈ {0,1}. In our surgeons data set the N actors are surgeons, and the Q adjacency
matrices represent different ways in which surgeons are related. For example, one ma-
trix may represent the sharing of the same hospital(s) and another matrix represnt the
sharing of same anaesthetists or assistants. The C labels associated with each surgeon
will denote behaviors, such as the performance of certain types of surgery or the use of
certain prosthetic devices.
The evolving and dynamic nature of behaviors is considered by examining two time
periods, t1 and t2 (t2 > t1). The behavioral status of the nodes at t1 and t2 are denoted as
Y(1),Y2 ∈ RN×C. We make the key assumption that the relationships among the nodes
influence the behavioral status of each node over time: this is central to our study as our
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primary objective is to predict the node’s behavioral status in the future period t2 based
on the available data at t1.
The (i, j) element of an adjacency matrix is a positive number that quantifies the
strength of a social relationship between actor i and actor j if a relationship exists,
and it is 0 otherwise. The diagonals of these adjacency matrices are set to zeros. As
mentioned above, more than one set of network relationships may be defined among
the same set of actors. Suppose we have a set of N = 5 nodes, and among the nodes,
there are Q = 2 network relationships as shown in Figure 7.1. Then we can summarize
the network relationships among the nodes with the corresponding adjacency matrices
given in Table 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Networks defined in terms of two different relationships.
Table 7.1: Adjacency matrices based on networks in Figure 7.1.
(a)
No
de
1
No
de
2
No
de
3
No
de
4
No
de
5
Node 1 0 3 1 0 2
Node 2 3 0 0 0 0
Node 3 1 0 0 2 0
Node 4 0 0 2 0 0
Node 5 2 0 0 0 0
(b)
No
de
1
No
de
2
No
de
3
No
de
4
No
de
5
0 0 5 0 0
0 0 1 3 0
5 1 0 0 0
0 3 0 0 4
0 0 0 4 0
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7.4 Models
In sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 we introduce two models that we will compare to the standard
majority vode model, briefly described in section 7.4.3.
7.4.1 Social Relationship Model (SRM)
Adjacency matrices are assumed to be symmetric because they capture the existence
of a relationship among actors. However the influence of the behavior of actor i on
the behavior of actor j is not necessarily symmetric, and it is important to build in the
model the possibility that some actors are more influential than others (for example by
being leaders in the adoption of new technologies). We formalize this by assuming that
node n in a network q has an influential index sq,n, where S ∈ RQ×N , representing the
amount of influence of node n the other nodes in network q that are connected to it. In
this model, we allow the influence to be both positive and negative.
The variables of interest are the C vectors y(2)c representing the behaviors of the
nodes at time t2, which are binary. Therefore we take a latent variable approach and
assume that the behavior at time t2 is driven by the latent variable N-vector yˆ
(2)
c defined
below:
yˆ(2)c = bc1+
Q
∑
q=1
[
Aqdiag(sq)
]
y(1)c (7.1)
where bc is a constant offset, 1 is an N× 1 vector of ones, sq is a column vector of S,
diag(sq) is the N×N matrix with sq on the diagonal and zeros elsewhere. The latent
variable model is then expressed as follows:
y(2)n,c =
1 if yˆ
(2)
n,c + εn,c > 0
−1 otherwise
(7.2)
where εn,c are i.i.d. random variables with cumulative distribution F(·). For ease of
computation we choose the distribution F to be the logistic function, and therefore
arrive to the following model for the future behavior at node n:
P
(
y(2)n,c = 1
∣∣A,y(1)c )= 1
1+ exp
(− yˆ(2)n,c)
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The unknows of the model are the vector of offsets b≡ (b1, . . . ,bc) and the matrix S of
influential indices. The negative log-likelihood f (S,b) for model 7.2 is easily derived
as follows:
f (S,b) =− log
[
C
∏
c=1
∏
n:y(2)n,c=1
P
(
y(2)n,c = 1
∣∣A,y(1)c ) (7.3)
∏
n:y(2)n,c=−1
P
(
y(2)n,c =−1
∣∣A,y(1)c )] (7.4)
=
C
∑
c=1
N
∑
n=1
log
(
1+ exp
(− y(2)n,c yˆ(2)n,c)) (7.5)
We note that in our model the number of unknowns (N×Q+C) is roughly equal to
the number of samples (N×C), and therefore a regularizing term is necessary in order
to avoid overfitting [61, 82]. Since our application of interest will be the adoption or
usage of certain technologies or procedure, we expect that only a relatively few number
of surgeons will have a considerable effect on their peers. Therefore an `1 regularizing
term that enforces sparsity seems better suited to this task than the standard `2 term.
Hence we propose to estimate the unknowns of the model by minimizing the following
cost function:
H(S,b) =
C
∑
c=1
N
∑
n=1
log
(
1+ exp
(− y(2)n,c yˆ(2)n,c))+λ‖S‖1
where λ is the regularization parameter that controls the sparsity of the matrix S and
‖S‖1 is the sum of the absolute values of S. Since the objective function H(S,b) is
convex, global optimal solutions can be obtained. We implemented the model in Matlab
using the popular convex solver CVX [37].
7.4.2 Positive Social Relationship Model (P-SRM)
In a number of situations it is sensible to assume that if two nodes are connected in
a network then the influence that they have on each other can only be positive, that is
it can only lead to a reinforcement of a behaviour. A similar hypothesis was made in
the work by Wei et al. [64], where they studied the prediction of app adoption by smart
phone users. In the context of our model this assumption is formalized by assuming that
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the behaviors are represented by binary values taking values in {0,1}, and by assuming
that the unknown parameters b and S that enter the latent variable have all non-negative
entries. We refer to this model as the Positive Social Relationship Model (P-SRM), and
we will see shortly that it may have better performances than the unconstrained model
in certain situations.
Since the latent variables are now all positive by constructions, model 7.2 needs to
be revised so that the density F(·) is supported on the positive axis. We follow Wei et
al. [64] in defining the conditional probability of a positive outcome as follows:
P
(
y(2)n,c = 1
∣∣A,y(1)c )= 1− exp(− yˆ(2)n,c)
The weighted negative log-likelihood associated to this model has the form:
f (S,b) =−
C
∑
c=1
N
∑
n=1
Wn,c log
(
y(2)n,c +(1−2y(2)n,c)exp
(− yˆ(2)n,c))
and therefore the parameters estimates for this model solve the following constrained
optimization problem:
(Sˆ, bˆ) = argmin
S,b
f (S,b)+λ‖S‖1
subject to: S≥ 0,b≥ 0
As with model 7.2 the optimization problem above is also convex and therefore global
optimal solutions can be computed.
7.4.3 Baseline Model OMV
One of the simplest methods for network node prediction is the online majority vote
(OMV) algorithm. When applied to our context the OMV algorithm predicts future
behaviors at a node by taking a majority vote of the current behaviors of the neighbors
of that node, weighted by the strength of the network relationship. Despite its simplicity
this method proved to be highly effective and outperform other more complex methods
on a variety of data sets [3]. In formulas the predicted behaviors have the following
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form:
yˆ(2)c = sign
(
Q
∑
q=1
Aqy
(1)
c
)
In the OMV algorithm the influence of a node on another is fixed, and given by the
elements of the adjacency matrix. Therefore this algorithm is unable to discover, based
on the data, which nodes may have more influence in predicting future behaviors.
7.5 Artificial Data Experiments
In this section we compare the models described above (SRM, P-SRM and OMV) on
two artificial data sets, generated according to the SRM and P-SRM models, respec-
tively. The artificial data sets consist of three networks encoded by Q = 3 adjacency
matrices. Each network has N = 60 nodes and each node is associated with C = 10
binary labels. In the log-likelihood all the observations are assumed to have the same
weight. The data sets are generated as described below.
Artificial data: SRM
1. The adjacency matrices Aq are constructed by randomly deleting 95% of the edges
of the fully connected graph.
2. The labels for the first period Y(1), where yn,c ∈{−1,1} are sampled from a binomial
distribution with balanced classes of labels.
3. The influential index sq,n of each node n in network q was generated according
to a uniform distribution over an interval. For the training set the interval was
set to [−10,10], while for the test set the interval was set to [−α,α], with α ∈
{0,2,4,6,8,10}. Six different data sets were created, corresponding to the six val-
ues of α .
4. The dependent variable is determined using a simplified version of the SRM model
7.2, in which the noise is negligible. Therefore the dependent variables are simply
obtained by taking the sign of the corresponding latent variables:
yˆ(2)c = sign
(
Q
∑
q=1
[
Aqdiag(sq)
]
y(1)c
)
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Artificial data: P-SRM
1. The adjacency matrices Aq are constructed by randomly deleting 95% of the edges
of the fully connected graph.
2. The labels for the first period Y(1), where yn,c ∈ {0,1} are sampled from a binomial
distribution with balanced classes of labels.
3. The influential index sq,n for n in network q was generated using the same procedure
as for the SRM data, except that the interval was restricted to the positive numbers.
4. As with the SRM data the values of the dependent variables were assigned by a
simple thresholding of the latent variable, where the threshold has been set to 0.5 to
account for the positivity constraint:
yˆ(2)c = sign
(
Q
∑
q=1
[
Aqdiag(sq)
]
y(1)c −0.5
)
7.5.1 Performance tests
We compare the three models OMV, SRM and P-SRM on the two artificial data sets
described above. The data sets are split into training and test sets with equal sample
sizes and the performances of the algorithms are evaluated by the followig standard
four metrics: precision, recall, accuracy and F-measure. The regularization parameter
λ is set to 0.5 for all experiments, since we found that changing its value and attempting
to optimize it did not affect performances to great extent.
Note that we expect the models to perform best when the training data consists of
surgeons who have a significant influential index compared to the surgeons in the test
set, or, alternatively, if surgeons in the test set have small influential index. Therefore
in the generation of the baseline data sets we set the influential indices of test samples
to zero. In the sensitivity analysis of section 7.5.2 we will then allow the influential
indices in the test set to grow, by varying the parameter α introduced in the description
of the data generation above. This allows to study how performances degarde as the
data become increasingly difficult to predict.
In Figure 7.2 (a) and (b) we report the performance measures for the SRM and
P-SRM data sets respectively. We observe that the SRM model and the P-SRM model
outperform the other models on the SRM and P-SRM data sets, respectively. This result
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is expected and it is important for two reasons: 1) it is a sanity check that confirms that
the models are internally consistent, and 2) it gives us an idea of how much better the
SRM and P-SRM can perform, compared to OMV.
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Figure 7.2: The four performance measures for the the three algorithms on the SRM
data (a) and the P-SRM data (b). As expected the SRM model outperforms both the
OMV and P-SRM when applied to the SRM data and the P-SRM outperforms OMV
and the SRM when applied to the P-SRM data.
7.5.2 Sensitivity to influential index
In the baseline data of figure 7.2 the influential index for the surgeons in the test data
was set to 0. This makes the problem easier, because it implies that their future behavior
depends mostly on the behavior of the surgeons in the training set. Varying the scaling
factor α from 0 to 1 we obtain data sets that are increasingly more difficult to pre-
dict, and it is therefore interesting to study how the performances of the three different
method degrade.
The results of this experiment on the SRM data are shown in Figure 7.3. The key
message emerging from this figure is that even if the performance of the SRM and P-
SRM algorithm degrade as the complexity of problem increases they perform much
bettter than OMV even in the hardest case.
7.5.3 Sensitivity to network sparsity
The sparsity of the network is defined as the proportion of edges that are not connected.
In the baseline data the three networks have a sparsity equal to 95%. Since different
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Figure 7.3: As the influential index S of test samples increase, the performance of SRM
and P-SRM decreases, however SRM and P-SRM still outperforms the baseline method
OMV.
applications may have networks with different sparsity it is important to understand
whether the performances of the algorithms change with the sparsity of the network.
Intuitively the OMV algorithm is expected to perform better at a high sparsity level,
with very localized interaction. Since the SRM and P-SRM algorithms learn networks
effects from the data one would expect them to be reasonably insensitive to the sparsity
level.
We repeated the experiments for levels of sparsity varying from 55% to 95%, in
steps of 5%, and report the results in Figure 7.4. The key message of the figure is that
the performances of the SRM algorithms are unaffected by the sparsity level. The P-
SRM algorithm is somewhat more sensitive to the overall sparsity level, and tend to
perform slightly better at higher sparsity. This is also true for the OMV model, which
is the most sensitive of the three.
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Figure 7.4: SRM has the best performance, while OMV has the least scores when
varying values of sparsity of networks. We also notice that SRM has the most stable
and robust performance.
7.6 Hospital Data Set
7.6.1 Data Preparation
In order to study the problem in a reasonable granularity, we examines knee procedures
as the exemplar treatment group, utilizing data from the health insurance industry. In the
following sub-sections, we describe how the hospital data was prepared before applying
our models.
7.6.1.1 Surgeon networks
We are interested in studying surgeon behavior. In particular we wish to predict the
behavior of a surgeon at time t2 given the behavior of his/her peers at time t1. There
are different ways in which surgeons can affect each other’s behaviors, and each corre-
sponds to a separate network. The simplest form of interaction between two surgeons
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arises from the fact that they practice at the same hospital. Therefore we construct a
network that has one node for each surgeon in the data and one edge for each pair of
surgeons practicing at the same hospitals. More precisely the element (i, j) of the ad-
jacency matrix Ah is equal to the number of hospitals that surgeons i and j have in
common.
However it is also possible that surgeons influence each other via the people who
work closely with them. Our data of patient surgeries contains unique identification
for surgeons, assistants and anaesthetists. Therefore we define other two networks,
represented by the adjacency matrices Aan and Aas, such that element (i, j) of these
matrices is equal to the number of anaesthetists and assistants that surgeons i and j
have previously worked with, respectively. The details of the adjacency matrices are
summarized in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2: The three networks used in the hospital data experiments.
Notation Description Nodes Edge Weight
Ah ∈ RN×N Adjacency matrix of surgeons working in the same hospital Surgeons Number of common hospitals
Aan ∈ RN×N Adjacency matrix of surgeons working with the same anaesthetists Surgeons Number of common anaesthetists
Aas ∈ RN×N Adjacency matrix of surgeons working with the same assistants Surgeons Number of common assistants
7.6.1.2 Surgical procedures
The number and composition of the procedures performed by surgeons fluctuates over
time in a non-random way. Surgeons data show clear trends where some procedures gets
dropped while others are adopted. We hypothesize that one of the reasons behind these
trends, other than demand fluctuations, is the fact that surgeons may influence each
other in a number of ways. It is particularly interesting to study how trends propagate,
and a natural question to ask is whether changes in behavior this year predict changes
in behaviors next year.
We formalize this notion by introducing a set of binary variables Y(1),Y(2) ∈RN×C,
where N is the number of surgeons in the data, C is the number of surgical procedures
we consider and the superscripts refer to period 1 and 2. When ytn,c is equal to 1 it means
that during period t (t = 1,2) surgeon n has increased his/her activity on procedure c.
In order to determine the value of ytn,c for each surgeon and each procedure we
proceed as follows. We divide period t (one year) in an even number L time windows,
and for each window α we compute the number vα of procedures of type c performed
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by surgeon n (we dropped the indices n and c from vα in order to ease notation). The
vector v with elements vα captures the trend of usage of procedure over time. In order
to convert it to a binary variable we apply a linear filter to it. The linear filter allocates
higher weight closer to the endpoints and subtracts the second half of the vector from the
first. The precise form of filtering is described in Algorithm 5 below. In our experiments
we choose L = 4, so that there were 4 windows of three months each.
Algorithm 5 Surgeon Binary Labeling
Input: v ∈ RL: Number of specific behaviors over L continuous time windows.
Output: Labels y ∈ {−1,1} or y ∈ {0,1}.
1: F = ∑
L
2
i=1(2i−1)(vL−i+1− vi)
2: if F > 0 then
3: y = 1
4: else
5: y =−1 for SRM, y = 0 for P-SRM,
6: end if
7: Return y
In our hospital data set we have identified 20 procedures related to knee surgery, and
therefore C = 20. In Australian hospital data each type of surgery procedure is assigned
a unique Medicare Benefit Schedule (MBS) code [21]. The distribution of the MBS
codes is shown in Figure 7.5 and the MBS code descriptions are provided in Table 7.3.
We observe there are three MBS codes performed much more frequently than the other
procedures.
7.6.1.3 Prosthetic devices
In addition to surgical procedures we are also interested in investigating the behavioral
change of surgeons related to the use of prosthetic devices. In knee procedures, surgeons
can be influenced by other surgeons by either adopting or dropping a particular device.
The hospital data allows to identify the specific prosthetic device used by each surgeon,
and therefore the prediction problem is exactly as the one described in the previous
section, with MBS codes replaced by codes for prosthetic devices. Thus, the algorithm
to extract the binary labels for prosthetic devices is the same as in Algorithm 5.
The distribution of prosthetic devices is depicted in Figure 7.6 and a sample of
the devices is shown in Table 7.4. Unlike with surgical procedure, where few MBS
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Figure 7.5: Distribution of surgical procedures performed in the hospital data.
codes dominate the distribution, it appears that surgeons use prosthetic devices in simi-
lar amounts, with no particular preference.
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Figure 7.6: Distribution of prosthetic devices in the hospital data.
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7.6.1.4 Observation weighting
Over the course of our experiments we found useful to assign weights to each obser-
vation appearing in the likelihood of equation 7.5, in order to account for the fact that
there is a wide variation in the number of procedures performed by surgeons. Therefore
for each surgeon n and procedure c we compute the total number wn,c of procedures
performed. Rather than setting weights equal to wn,c, that would allow few very ac-
tive surgeons to dominate the likelihood we opted for a logarithmic weight of the form
log(1+wn,c), which performed better than linear weighting in our experiments.
7.6.2 Experimental Results
In this section we compare the three models, SRM, P-SRM and OMV on the hospital
data. We consider two types of dependent variables: one is the behavior of surgeons re-
garding the performance of specific surgeries, identified by 20 different MBS codes, and
the other is the behavior regarding the implant of specific prosthetic devices, identified
by 10 different prosthetic codes.
7.6.2.1 Surgical procedures
In our hospital data we selected surgeons with at least 100 surgeries performed over a
two year period, obtaining a sample size of 121 surgeons. The training and test sets
were randomly selected using equal sample sizes. In order to avoid random variation
due to choice of training and test data set each experiment was repeated 10 times over
different training and test data, and the performance measures were averaged of the 10
results.
We calculate performance results in the test data for each MBS code separately as
well as in the aggregate. Since the MBS code specific results are well reflected in the
aggregate results, for ease of exposition we only report the aggregate results, which are
shown in Figure 7.7(a).
What stands out from Figure 7.7(a) is that SRM and P-SRM have similar perfor-
mances, with P-SRM having a small advantage over SRM. Both models seem to have a
major advantage on the OMV model when it comes to recall. Therefore the two models
outperform OMV by a large margin in the task of correctly identifying surgeons who
will increase the use of specific procedures in the next period.
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Figure 7.7: The four performance measures for the the three algorithms on the MBS
codes (a) and the prosthesis data (b).
An attractive feature of the SRM and P-SRM models is that it provides, for each sur-
geon, an estimate of the associated influential index. Therefore these models allow to
identify, for example, who are the leaders of innovation in a surgeon network. We hy-
pothesize that in our hospital data only a small number of surgeons would be “leaders”.
This hypothesis is easily tested by looking at the distribution of the values of the three
groups of influential indices (one for each network) estimated by the SRM model, that
we report in Figure 7.8. A close inspection of the figure would reveal that only 13%
of the influential indices are significantly different from 0, and only few surgeons have
influential indices of the order of three or four. The figure also shows that the vast
majority of influential indices are positive. This may explain why the P-SRM model
performs better than the SRM model, since it makes the positivity assumption from the
beginning, and therefore the algorithm does not need to “discover” it from the data.
Studying the estimates of the influential indices can also provide other useful insight
in the data. For example, we observe that the three set of influential indices, one for each
type of network, are quite uncorrelated, with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.07
to 0.23. This finding support the notion that SRM and P-SRM models truly capture
network effects, and not other features of the data, such as for example hospital effects.
In fact, if that were the case, we would expect the influential indices to be quite similar
and highly correlated, which is certainly not the case.
We further analyzed three distinct networks to compute the social influence of sur-
geons. The three networks analyzed are based on: (a) connections among surgeons who
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Table 7.3: MBS code description
Code number MBS code MBS code description # of surgeries
1 49509 Knee, total synovectomy or arthrodesis with ... 109
2 49517 Knee, hemiarthroplasty of (Anaes.) (Assist.) 643
3 49518 Knee, total replacement arthroplasty of... 7084
4 49519 Knee, total replacement arthroplasty of... 442
5 49521 Knee, total replacement arthroplasty of... 564
6 49524 Knee, total replacement arthroplasty of... 116
7 49527 Knee, total replacement arthroplasty of... 396
8 49533 Knee, total replacement arthroplasty of... 123
9 49536 Knee, repair or reconstruction of, for... 146
10 49539 Knee, reconstructive surgery of cruciate... 325
11 49542 Knee, reconstructive surgery of cruciate ... 2876
12 49551 Knee, revision of procedures to which item... 357
13 49557 Knee, diagnostic arthroscopy of ... 189
14 49558 Knee, arthroscopic surgery of, involving... 383
15 49560 Knee, arthroscopic surgery of, involving... 1153
16 49561 Knee, arthroscopic surgery of, involving... 16353
17 49562 Knee, arthroscopic surgery of, involving... 771
18 49563 knee, arthroscopic surgery of, involving... 270
19 49564 Knee, patello-femoral stabilisation of... 338
20 49566 Knee, arthroscopic total synovectomy of... 457
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Figure 7.8: As expected the influential indices estimated by the SRM model show that
the surgeon network contains a very small number of surgeon “leaders”, with high
influential indices. The overall sparsity of the indices is 13%, meaning that only 13%
of the influential indices are significantly different from zero.
work at the same hospital (b) connections among surgeons who work with the same
anaesthetists, and (c) connections among surgeons who work with the same assistant
surgeons.
Figure 7.9 shows the comparative performance of most influential surgeons in the
three networks, in regard to their adoption of certain types of knee procedures. A dis-
tinct influencer is evident in the anaesthetist-sharing network while performing CMBS
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Figure 7.9: Comparative workload distribution of most influential surgeons in the three
networks.
code 6, which indicates a specific type of knee replacement requiring bone grafting.
It also indicates that the anaesthetist network appears to have a higher influence in
the surgeon behaviour in regard to this specific procedure, which is more complex as this
requires bone grafting, and more anaesthetists time while performing knee replacement
surgeries.
7.6.2.2 Prosthetic devices
Another variable of interest is whether surgeons increase or decrease the number of
implants of specific prosthetic devices in the next period. The experimental results
on the prosthetic devices data set shown in Figure 7.7(b). Similarly to the results for
surgical procedure we find that both the SRM and P-SRM model outperform the OMV
model. However, on this data set it is the SRM that outperforms P-SRM, which is the
opposite of what we found on the surgical procedure data. We also notice that while in
the surgical data most of the advantage over OVM was observed in recall, in this case
most of the advantage is manifested in the precision performance measure. Therefore
the performance measure on which we observe the highest difference between SRM,
or P-SRM, and OVM appears to be a property of the data, rather than the methods
themselves.
7.7. SUMMARY 105
Table 7.4: Prosthesis code description
Code number Prosthesis code Prosthesis code description # of surgeries
1 BX246 Infusor; Sterile infusor devices, spring or... 1081
2 DP107 CMW Bone Cement; CMW Bone Cement Various without Antibiotic 763
3 DP152 PFC Sigma Knee System patella component; Cemented, all ... 868
4 HK006 Palacos or Palamed Bone Cement with Gentamicin; Single Mix ... 3582
5 SK325 Triathlon Knee System Femoral Component ; Minimally ... 966
6 SK327 Triathlon Knee System Tibial Baseplate; Tibial ... 1051
7 SK419 Triathlon Knee System Patella Component; Patella ... 637
8 SN464 Bone Staple; Fixation - Short Leg 784
9 SN853 Endobutton; Fixation for ACL or PCL reconstruction 1708
10 SN857 Genesis II Knee System Tibial Baseplate; Tibial Baseplate... 1854
7.6.2.3 Comparing results
The experimental results on MBS codes are similar to the results for prosthetic devices
in the sense that they both perform better than OMV. A key difference, however, is
the performance of the P-SRM compared to SRM on the two data sets. Specifically,
P-SRM outperforms SRM on surgical procedures, while SRM outperforms P-SRM on
prosthetic devices.
The reason for this difference may lie with the fact that in terms of MBS codes,
surgeons are more likely to assert a positive influence on other surgeons. In other words,
a surgeon adopting a new procedure will probably cause the surgeons connected to him
to do the same. Howecer, a surgeon dropping a procedure will not have any influence
on the surgeons connected to him, and the P-SRM model is better suited to fit this
assumption. However, in the case of prosthetic devices it is reasonable that surgeons
can both positively and negatively influence the connected surgeons, and therefore this
would make the SRM preferable.
7.7 Summary
In this chapter we have proposed a Social Relationship Model (SRM) to predict how
a surgeon’s choice of treatment is influenced by their peer networks. In a surgeon
network, the nodes are surgeons and there is an edge between two nodes if they have
operated in the same hospital or have worked with a common anaesthetist or assistant.
SRM consists of an extension of the logistic regression model to incorporate network
features. A unique contribution of this work is the application of the proposed model
on an extremely fine-grained data set acquired from a health insurance company about
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the eco-system surrounding knee surgeons. SRM can be used to quantify the influence
of a surgeon on their peers over time. While it is well known that peer interaction
plays an important role in diffusion of knowledge and behavioral choices in a healthcare
environment, our approach provides the first quantitative tool to actually measure the
impact of social learning. SRM can be used by both practicing healthcare professional
and management to shape the treatment environment in an organization and manage
both the quality and cost of healthcare.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter we present a summary of the thesis, and highlight future research direc-
tions that could be extended from the research of the thesis.
8.1 Conclusions of the Thesis
• Adversarial learning is the study of machine learning techniques deployed in non-
benign environments. Till now, the standard assumption about modeling adver-
sarial behavior has been to empower an adversary to change all features of the
classifiers at will. However, we claimed the aim of an adversary is not just to
subvert a classifier but carry out data transformation in a way such that spam
continues to appear like spam to the user as much as possible. In Chapter 3 we
demonstrated that an adversary achieves this objective by carrying out a sparse
feature attack. We designed an algorithm to show how a classifier should be de-
signed to be robust against sparse adversarial attacks. We showed that sparse
feature attacks are best defended by designing classifiers which use `1 regulariz-
ers.
• Chapter 4, We use mathematical properties of the two regularization methods,
`1 (Lasso) and `2 (Tikhonov or Ridge), followed by detailed experimentation
to understand their impact based on four characteristics: non-stationarity of the
data generating process; level of noise in the data sensing mechanism; degree of
correlation between dependent and independent variables and the shape of the
data set. Thus, by considering the four characteristics, we developed a guide
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for practitioners of large scale data mining and machine learning tools in their
day-to-day practice.
• In Chapter 5, we claim that LPP is the fundamental problem in outlier detection
and algorithmic approaches to solve LPP are urgently needed. Matrix factoriza-
tion methods provide a balanced compromise between full subspace exploration
in the feature space versus exploration in the meta-feature or latent space. Results
showed that our proposed model R-NMF is substantially more robust compared
to NMF in the presence of data noise. This opens up a promising avenue for
further exploration and address the LPP.
• Data analytic techniques such as data mining and predictive modelling are be-
ing used to gain new insights into health care costs, In chapter 6 we described
a specific context of private healthcare in Australia and describe our SNA based
approach (applied to health insurance claims) to understand the nature of col-
laboration among doctors treating hospital inpatients and explore the impact of
collaboration on cost and quality of care. In particular, we use network analysis
to (a) design collaboration models among surgeons, anaesthetists and assistants
who work together while treating patients admitted for specific types of treat-
ments (b) identify and extract specific types of network topologies that indicate
the way doctors collaborate while treating patients and (c) analyse the impact of
these topologies on cost and quality of care provided to those patients.
• In Chapter 7 we developed models that predict the behaviors of orthopedic sur-
geons in regard to surgery type and use of prosthetic device. The models utilize
data on past practicing behaviours and take in account the social relationships
existing among surgeons, anaesthetists and assistants. We refer to the models
as the Social Relationship Model (SRM) and Positive Social Relationship Model
(P-SRM). An important feature of these models is that they can not only predict
the behaviors of surgeons but they can also provide an explanation for the pre-
dictions. Experimental results on both artificial and real hospital data sets show
that our proposed models outperform the baseline model Online Majority Vote
(OMV).
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8.2 Recommendations for Future Work
We have presented a number of robust learning models in this thesis. We also developed
models mining adversarial behaviors on healthcare data. Here we also list potential
future research directions.
• In Chapter 3, we developed robust classification algorithms by assuming the
adversary is carrying out sparse feature attacks. Similarly adversary can exist
in anomaly detection and clustering problems. The need for a robust learning
method under such problems is in need to be devised.
• For healthcare domain, in Chapter 7, we have proposed models that predict the
potential adversarial behavior of surgeons. However, more modelling technique
can be carried out based on entities such as hospitals, patients or even adminis-
trators working in the hospital. The reward for such adversarial behavior iden-
tification will not only reduce cost for insurance company, but also significantly
increase the quality of care and even help improve the overall healthcare system.
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